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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The three studies to be reported in this dissertation compare 
actual human behavior with the normative behavior called for by a 
mathematical model. 'Hhen it is shown that human behavior deviates from 
the normative model, in some systematic manner, as is expected, attempts 
are .made to rationalize that behavior; analyze it in such a way that 
the deviations are systematized and understandable. 
These studies are concerned with the comparison of behavior with 
the following expected value model: 
EV = pR + (1-p)L. l, 2 
The results obtained give information about human decision making 
in risky situations. A number of such studies have been carried out 
within the past 15 years and this dissertation may be seen as an ad-
dition to that body of literature.3 The present studies grew out of an 
experiment by Preston and Baratta. which indicated that individuals over-
estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of an event when its proba-
bility is 0.01 and 0.05 and underestimate the likelihood of events with 
lEv = expected value. p = probability of winning. R = reward or 
amount won. (1-p) =probability of losing. L = amount lost (a nega-
tive quantity). 
2John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald L. Thompson, Intro-
duction to Finite Mathematics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1957), p. 166. 
3ward Edwards, "The Theory of Decision Making," Psychological 
Bulletin, 51 (1954), 380-417. 
l 
probabilities of 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 and 0.99.1 
Before presenting the details of the Preston and Baratta study 
and the questions the present studies were designed to answer, some 
relevant discussions and questions found in the literature will be 
reviewed. 
Although the concepts of ·rationality and irrationality are often 
used by psychologists,Katona points out that they have neglected deal-
ing directly and systematically with the principle of rationality. 
Among the social scientists economists have made rationality a funda-
mental assumption when considering human behavior. Katona makes no 
attempt to define rationality with any degree of precision: his paper 
was meant to "indicate some promising leads for a study of rationality. 112 
For economists rational behavior has as its goal the maximization of 
profits or utility. Katona believes that the work of psychologists con-
cerning associative learning and habit formation may serve to clarify 
the problems of rationality.3 
Despite the fact that such terms as illogical, unreasonable and 
bizarre, which have connotations of irrationality, are used to describe 
the mentally ill, the literatures of clinical psychology and psychiatry 
contain few systematic studies of rationality and irrationality. 
lMalcolm Preston and Philip Baratta, "An Experimental Study of 
the Auction Value of an Uncertain Outcome," The American Journal of 
Psychology, 61 {1948), 183-93. 
2George Katona, "Rational Behavior and Economic Behavior," 
Psychological Review, 60 (1953), 317. 
3rbid., pp. 307-18. 
2 
One of the few discussions of the concepts of rationality-irra-
tionality can be found in French. In a discussion of the relationship 
of theories of learning to the problem of behavior he comments: 
11Common sense distinguishes between rational and irra-
tional behavior . Rational behavior is behavior that is 
effectively guided by an understanding of the situation to 
which one is reacting and by a knowledge of how to get 1vhat 
one wants ." 1 
This distinction that French made was not the main object of his 
discussion but 1.re may take it as an indication of the thinking about 
rationality and irrationality in the psychiatric literature. 
Goldstein, though he does not deal directly with the problem of 
rational behavior, does deal with related problems in his discussion of 
the schizophrenic thought disorder. His studies led him to conclude 
that it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of human behavior, 
the abstract and the concrete. The reduction or loss of the abstract 
attitude is present in schizophrenia and is a change within the intel-
lectual sphere that is a basic disturbance of the functioning of the 
organism.2 
Von Doroarus contrasts the logical thinking of the normal with the 
paralogical thinking of the schizophrenic. He states, "whereas the 
logician accepts only the mode of Barbara, or one of its modifications, 
as a basis for valid conclusions, the paralogician concludes identity 
3 
lThomas French, "The Integration of Behavior," I (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1952), 16. 
2Kurt Goldstein, "Methodological Approach to the Study of Schizo-
phrenic Thought Disorder," Language and Thought in Schizophrenia, ed. 
J.s. Kasanin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), pp. 17-
39. 
from the similar nature of the adjective. 111 
. The present work is quite different from previous studies of 
rationality-irrationality. 11Rational behavior" is defined by a spe-
cific mathematical model and will be exhibited by few if any of our 
subjects. It is not expected that the behavior of normals or schizo-
phrenics will conform to it precisely: rather interest is centered in 
studying deviations from the model. 
Ramsey in a theoretical article "Truth and Probability11 discussed 
the concept of partial belief.2 His ideas stemmed from the di scussions 
concerning the various interpretations of probability statements. He 
agrees that the mathematical notions of probability are secure and the 
frequency theory provides a simple and useful interpretation of proba-
bility. 
However, Ramsey's center of interest is in the logic of partial 
lE. Von Domarus, "The Specific Laws of Logic in Schizophrenia," 
Language and Thought in Schizophrenia, ed. J.S. Kasanin {Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1944), p. 111. 
2Ramsey uses the terms "partial belief" and "degree of belief" for 
the subjective scale of probabilities individuals have that correspond 
to objective probabilities. Preston and Baratta termed a similar con-
cept "psychological probability" and Ed1orards has used the terms "proba-
bility preferences" and "subjective probability." Although these terms 
have a common meaning, subjective values corresponding to objective 
probability values, there are important differences among them. The 
experimental operations used by each author are essential to the under-
standing of each concept. Empirical findings are more meaningful when 
the differences in operations are recognized. I will use the terms 
"degree of belief" vrhen referring to Ramsey ' s Hork; 11psychological 
probability" for this and the Preston and Baratta work. "Subjective 
probability" and "probability preferences" will refer to Edwards ' work. 
Ramsey's discussion can be found in F.P. Ramsey, "Truth and Probability," 
The Foundations of Hathematics and Other Logical Essays, (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 158- 98. 
4 
belief. When people are not certain that something is true and they 
are not certain it is false, Ramsey states that they have a partial or 
probab~e belief. It is this belief that Ramsey tries to describe 
quantitatively. He takes what is essentially an operational vieHpoint. 
The degree of belief has "no precise meaning unless we specify more 
exactly how it is to be measured. nl Degree of belief ivill have meaning 
when the operations which define it are made clear. Ramsey concludes 
that in.trospective methods should be rejected and degree of belief 
should be measured by action or behavior.2 
The behavior he chooses is the method of the bet. Ramsey con-
cludes that a bet method is fundamentally sound and goes on to develop 
a method of measuring belief utilizing betting. He defends this method 
by saying that all our lives we are in a sense betting. "~·lhenever He 
go to the station -vre are betting that a train ,.rill really run, and if 
1o1e had not a sufficient degree of belief in this \.Je should decline the 
bet and stay at home. 113 
Ramsey proposes a view of the measurement of psychological proba-
bility or partial belief that has the following elements: (a) partial 
belief may be measured, (b) it is defined by the operations of measure-
ment, (c) the measurements should consist of action or behavior, (d) bet-
ting behavior is suitable for the measure of partial belief A 
libid.' p. 167 
2Ibid., p. ;1.71 
3Ibid., p. 183 
4Ibid., pp. 166-84 
5 
Related to the theoretical work of Ramsey are the experimental 
studies of Nogee,l Mosteller and Nogee,2 and Preston and Baratta.3 
These studies dealt with the concepts of utility and psychological 
probability. 
In a risky situa.tion \·There. an objective probability of gaining or 
losing an object, commodity, or amount of money is present, individuals 
may have subjective scales of value for the probability and the object. 
Mosteller and Nogee state: 
"The notion of utility is roughly this: Individuals behave 
as if they had a subjective scale of values for assessing the 
worth to them of different amounts of commodities, and this 
scale is not necessarily merely a stretching, or a translation 
of the physical scale in use in the market place. 11 4 
Just as individuals may have a subjective scale of value for money 
or commodities they may have a subjective scale of probabilities corre-
spending to the scale of objective probabilities ranging from 0 to l. 
The work of Preston and Baratta indicated that the concept of psycho-
logical probability is useful in helping in the understanding of human 
behavior Hhen it differs from the behavior called for by the expected 
value model. 5 
Using an auction bet method for measuring psychological proba-
bility Prestonand Baratta found that probabilities less than 0.25 are 
lPhilip Nogee, "Experimental Studies of Behavior in Risk Taking 
Situations." (Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Social Relations, Harvard 
University, 1952). 
2Fred Mosteller and Philip Nogee, *'An Experimental Measure of 
Utility," Journal of Political Economy, 59 (1951), 371-404. 
3Preston and Baratta, op. cit. 
4Mosteller and Nogee, op. cit., p. 371 
5Preston and Baratta, op. cit. 
6 
subject to systematic overestimation and probabilities equal to and more 
than 0.25 are subject to systematic underestimation. The authors inter-
preted their data, stating that an indifference point in the scale of 
subjeqtive probabilities was demonstrated, near the mathematical proba-
bility 0.20. Subjects in 'the study had varying amounts of knowledge of 
mathematical probability theory.l 
Griffith, in an analysis of horse race betting found results 
similar to Preston and Baratta's. Using the percentage of winners at 
an odds group as a measure of objective probability and the odds as a 
measure of psychological probability he found that for probabilities 
less than 0.16 psychological probabilities exceed objective probabil-
ities. For probabilities larger than 0.16 the reverse is true.2 
Sprowls analyzed French, Mexican and Spanish lotteries. His 
analysis yielded some equivocal results that tended to confirm the find-
ing that individuals overestima.te the probability of winning when that 
probability is belm-1 0. 20.3 
Attneave examined subjects' estimations of the occurrence of vrords 
in English text . His results were similar to those of Preston and 
Baratta. Subjects tended to overestimate those 1..rords 1.,rith a low 
lPreston and Baratta, op. cit., P• 193 
2R.M. Griffith, "Odds Adjustments of American Race Horse Betters," 
American Journal of Psychology, 62 (1949), 290-94. 
3R.G. Sprouls, "Psychological-Mathematical Probability in Relation-
ships of Lottery Gambles," American Journal of Psychology, 66 (1953), 
126-30. 
7 
probability of occurrence and underestimate those words with a higher 
probability of occurrence.l 
Ward Edwards in a series of studies has examined the concepts of 
probability preferences, utility and subjective probability.2,3,4 In 
his firs t studies he rejects the idea of a scale of subjective proba-
bilit y pointing out that in the Mosteller and Nogee, and Preston and 
Barat ta as well as his own studies, subjective probability and utility 
are confounded. He states that subjects do deviate from behaving in a 
way that will enable them to maximize expected value but he does not 
feel it is justifiable to .measure subjective probability on an interval 
scale unless we know or can assume utility has been held constant.5 
In his own work Edwards presented subjects with bets of equal ex-
pected value but differing amounts of money. Subjects were faced with 
making choices, paired comparisons, between bets of positive, negative 
and zero expected value . 6 
The results show that when subjects were faced with bets of equal 
lFred Attnea:ve, "Psychological Probability as a Function of Ex-
perienced Frequency," Journal of Exoerimental Psychology, 46 (1953), 
81-86. 
;q.J"ard Edwards, "Probability Preferences in Gamaling . " (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Dept. of Psychology, Harvard University, 1951) • 
.3ward Edwards, "Probability Preferences in Gambling," American 
Journal of Psychology, 56 (1953), 349-64. 
4tvard Edwards, ••Probability Prefe·re~ces Among Bets with Differing 
Expected Values," American Journal of Psychology, 57 (1954), 56-67. 
Sward Edwards, ttProbability Preferences in Gambling," American 
Journal of Psychology, p. 363 . 
6Ibid. 
8 
positive expected value they showed a preference for bets with a 4/8 
probability of winning and an aversion for bets with a 6/8 probability 
of losing. They consistently prefer the alternative which had the 
lower probabilities of losing although these bets had higher amounts of 
loss.l 
In a study of probability preferences among bets with differing 
expected values Edwards found that subjects did not always choose the 
bet with the largest expected value. Probability preferences could ex-
plain some of these choices but by no means all of them.2 
Edwards studied the reliability of his findings and found that 
replication of the experiment with different subjects, using worthless 
chips instead of real money, and changing the wording of the bets 
yielded substantially similar results. The same pattern of probability 
preferences were found when differing levels of expected value were used 
and in a non-gambling game situation.J 
In a. more recent study Edwards attempted to study subjective proba-
bllity. He tested a model that would e_nable him to make predictions of 
decisions among bets; attempting to get measurements of both subjective 
probability and utility and then successfully predicting decisions. He 
found that subjective probabilities of winning and losing money were 
somewhat different. In general subjects tend to overestimate their 
2Edwards, "Probability Preferences Among Bets with Differing Ex-
pected Values." 
.:3\.rard Edwards, "The Reliability of Probability Preferences, 11 
American Journal of Psychology, 67 (1954), 69-95. 
9 
chances of winning money while they have a fairly objective estimate 
of the chances of losing money. l 
Given this background of theoretical and experimental work the 
three studies that are the topic of this dissertation were undertaken 
to answer certain empirical and theoretical questions. The following 
are general questions that guided the planning of the studies. The 
symbolic statements of these questions will be presented in chapters 
3, 4, and 5. 
(1) 'Hill the findings of Preston and Baratta. be 
replicated using normal subjects? 
(2) Hm.r does the behavior of normal subjects de-
viate from the behavior called for by the expected 
value model? 
(3) Hm.J" does the behavior of schizophrenic subjects 
deviate from the behavior called for by the expected 
value .model? 
(4) Wi ll the schizophrenic subjects behave like 
the normals? If there are differences what are they? 
(5) Are there differences in the behavior of normals 
when amounts of play money are being accumulated and 
when they are being lost? 
(6) Are there differences in the behavior of schi zo-
phrenics when amounts of play money are being accu-
mulated and when they are being lost? 
(7) If there are differences in win and loss type 
situations are these differences similar in normals 
and schizophrenics? 
lward Edwards, 11The Prediction of Decisions Among Bets," Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 50(1955), 201-14. 
10 
(8) Do psychological probabilities (of normals) of 
mutually exclusive events sum to 1 as objective 
probabilities do? 
(9) Do psychological probabilities of schizophrenics 
sum to 1? 
(10) When psychological probabilities of normals 
and schizophrenics are summed, are there differences? 
(11) Does the size of the prize affect bidding 
behavior of normals in the Preston and Baratta game 
situation? 
(12) Does the !'3ize of the prize affect bidding 
behavior of schizophrenics in the Preston and Baratta 
game situation? 
11 
CHAPTER TT..J'O: THE NETHODS 
· 2.1 Introduction 
To answer the questions raised, three related experimental 
studies were done. The first was a repetition of the essential ele-
ments of the Preston and Baratta experiment using a group of normals 
and a group of schizophrenics. The second study was designed to obtain 
information to answer the questions concerning the summation of psycho-
logical probabilities; the third, to answer questions about behavior 
when amounts of play money are being lost. 
12 
It was not possible to obtain all the details of Preston's work 
before these studies began. As a result there are some minor differences 
between the replication and the original work.l 
2.2 Subjects 
A total of 80 subjects, 40 normals and 40 schizophrenics took part 
in the three studies. In the first study 20 aides and 20 schizophrenics 
participated. In the second study 16 of the aides and 12 of the 
patients "torho participated in the first study served as subjects. At-
tempts were made to use all 40 subjects of the first study in the second 
study but this was not possible. ·At the time the data of the second 
lThese differences are discussed in Section 2.6. 
study was collected 4 aides had resigned or were. transferred to an 
evening shift and were no longer available and 8 patients vrere dis-
charged or had become more seriously ill and were unable to play the 
experimental game. In the third study, 40 other subjects, 20 aides 
and 20 schizophrenics served. 
The patients were all hospitalized at the Brockton Veterans 
Administration Hospital and at the time of selection bore the diagnosis 
schizophrenia. The normal subj e.cts were psychiatric aides employed 
at the hospital. 
All but 2 of the patients were selected from the Acute Intensive 
Treatment (Admission) Service of the hospital and should not be con-
sidered a group of chronic schizophrenics.l All those selected were 
less than 40 years of age. When a list of appropriate patients was 
obtained, and if they were willing to participate in the study a Hoody-
McCall l-Uxed Fundamentals - Form I arithmetic test was administered 
as a screening device. If the subjects could multiply a quantity by a 
decimal we assumed that they were capable of the arithmetic compu-
tations necessary in computing an expected value and they were selected 
as subjects. If at any time during the study a patient wished to with-
draw from the study he was told that he could. 
Our normal subjects, the psychiatric aides, were selected some-
what differently. Nursing supervisors asked specific aides to serve as 
subjects and in addition asked for volunteers. The screening procedure 
lTwo patients were selected from one of the Continued Treatment 
(Chronic) Service buildings and some of the patients were transferred 
there d~ing the study. If the subjects were available after such a 
transfe.r they continued to serve as subjects. 
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was the same for the aides. As for the schizophrenics none over 40 
years of age served as a subject and every subject could multiply a 
quantity by a decimal. 
Once the subjects were selected, data collection proceeded with-
out incident until the third study. In the first two studies, where 
subjects "won money," only one game that was started was not completed: 
one aide indicated that he did not want to complete the game 
In the third study where the subjects were "losing money" through-
out the game four pairs of subjects who were selected did not finish 
the game and data from three other pairs of subjects were not used in 
the anal ysis. One pair of schizophrenic subjects said that they did not 
understand the instructions and did not start the practice trials. An-
other pair of schizophrenic subjects completed eleven trials •rhen one 
subject said he could not understand the pay-offs. Three additional 
pairs of schizophrenics completed the game but gave variable data that 
indicated they had an inadequate understanding of the game. 
The data from the two games played by the aides in the third study 
were not used. These subjects appeared confused or disinterested. 
2.3 The Materials Used 
The materials used in the studies consisted of: (1) a pair of 
dice, (2) $86,000 in play money, (J) 49 stimulus cards that contained 
the bets, (4) sheets that explained the betting procedures to the sub-
jects, (5) cigarettes and. candies. 
Data from the experimental sessions were recorded on a data sheet 
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included in the Appendix. 
2.4 The Three Experimental Games 
The experimental procedures consisted of three related experimental 
games, each designed to give data concerning one or more of the questions 
raised. 
2,41 The First Game 
The first game was a repetition of the essential elements of the 
Preston and Baratta method. The subjects played a competitive bidding 
game from which the estimates of psychological probability (P*)l were 
derived. A bet with a given probability of winning and an amount of re-
ward was auctioned off to two players. The expected value2 {EV) of the 
bet p = .50, R = $100 is $50.00: the probability of winning multiplied 
by the amount of the reward yields the expected value . A high bid of 
$50,00 for the bet with an EV of $50.00 would i ndicate that for the 
subjects, psychological probability equalsobjective probability which 
equals • 50. A bid of $75 .00 would indicate that the subject over-
estimated the likelihood of winning; the psychological probability was 
.75 while the objective probability was .50. 
The game was played with 49 cards: 7 cards were used in the 
practice trials and 42 in the experimental trials. Each card offered 
lThis symbol is taken from Edwards, "The Prediction of Decisions 
Among Bets," p. 201. 
2EV = pR where EV = expected value, p = probability of winning, 
R = amount of reward. 
15 
the subjects the opportunity to win a number of dollars with a given 
probability of winning. Six amounts of play money were involved; 5, 
50, 100, 250, 500 and 1000 dollars. The seven probabilities used were 
0.01, 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 and 0.99. The six amounts of money 
and seven probabilities yield 42 combinations of probability and reward. 
An amount of .money together with a probability constituted a bet and 
each bet appeared once in the 42 cards. Every game was played by 2 
players. 
Each subject was given $4000 worth of play .money, his endowment or 
bankroll. The 42 cards containing the bets were placed in random order 
which was the same for all games. One set of cards was placed between 
the subjects together with the information sheets that explained the 
meaning of probabilities, listed the amounts of rewards, explained the 
bidding procedure and listed the points corresponding to each proba-
bility.l All this material was in front of the subjects throughout the 
game and was used. 
The first practice card was turned up, read by the experimenter 
and auctioned to the higher bidder; bidding started at 1 dollar. Dur-
ing the seven practice trials the subjects learned the. details of bid-
ding and the pay-offs and had the opportunity to ask questions about the 
meaning of probabilities and other details of the game. 
After the bidding was completed for each bet, the higher bidder 
rolled a pair of dice, trying to make a point. If both subjects passed, 
lThese sheets of paper together \orith the experimenter's instruc-
tion sheet are found in the Appendix. 
16 
the bet was not considered. The probability of each point was computed 
and equal to the probability on the card.l If the point was made the 
higher bidder received the amount of the reward minus his bi d but if 
the point was not made the higher bidder paid the amount he bid. This 
was done for the 7 practice tr~als and 42 experimental trials. 
For the practice trials the amounts won or lost were not kept by 
the experimenter or subject . The money did 11change hands 11 as an aid in 
learning the game. 
At the end of the game the player with more money, the winner, 
received his choice of a pack of cigarettes or 5 candy bars . The loser 
was given a single candy bar for participating in the game. 
The data recorded consisted of the highest bid of each subject, 
which subject took the bi d and ••hether he won or lost. 
In all games the subjects asked questions of the experimenter and 
were permitted to speak to each other . 'rhe experimenter responded to 
questions by repeating the revelant portions of the instructions or 
rewording them. 
Although it pr.obably would have been possible and preferable to 
prevent the subjects from communicating with each other this would have 
posed certain difficulties. The subjects were in competi tion and some 
of them, (particularly in the normal group) became very involved and 
interested in the game. On occasion,when a highly involved subject 
would win or lose a bet with a low probability of such win or loss he, 
and at times his partner, would react loudly with moans, shouts, or 
lThe computation of probabilities is presented in the Appendix. 
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laughter. 
The subjects were prevented from communicating with each other 
concer ning how to play the game but some remarks about Sf:l opponent's 
behavior were made by the subjects. 
In all games if a subject felt he made an error in the bidding he 
was allm.red to change it if the auction was not completed. However, if 
the auction was completed the subject had to play as his bid dictated. 
Where a subject indicated that he felt he made an error the subject's 
"corrected bid" was used in the data analysis. 
2.42 The Second Game 
In the second study we were primarily interested in getting a 
measure of psychological (1-p). 'tlhere p = .25, (1-p) = .75. A situa-
tion had to be designed to get some measure of psychological (1-p) or 
(1-P*). This was done in an experimental game in which the given proba-
bilities indicated the experimenter's likelihood of winning and the ex-
perimenter rolled the dice. For the subjects to compute an approximate 
(EV) and make a meaningful bid they had to complete a (1-p) process 
without the aid of pencil and paper and combine their estimate with an 
amount of reward. 
As an example, in the first study when the subject was faced vTi th 
the following bet, 
.25 100 
the expected value was (.25) ($100) = $25 .00. In the second game al-
though the stimulus material was the same, the subjects' behavior was 
different. The subjects had to complete the following process. 1·1hen 
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the experimenter's likelihood of winning was .25, the subjects' proba~ 
bility of winning was (1-.25) or .75. The subject then went through an 
EV estimation process, EV = {1-.25) {100) or $75.00 . From the subjects 
bids in this game the estimate of psychological (1-p), (1-P*) was ob-
tained. 
To obtain the measure of (1-P*) the procedures of the first game 
were changed in the following ways. The probabilities given were now 
said to be the experimenter's likelihood of winning and the experimenter 
rolled the dice. If he made the ifinning point the higher bidder paid 
the amount of his bid to the experimenter. If the experimenter did not 
make the point he pai~ the higher bidder the total amount of the prize 
minus the bid. 
Aside from these changes the procedures of the two games were the 
same.l 
2.43 The Third Game 
The third game was designed to get information concerning hmr sub-
jects evaluate the likelihood of an objective probability when they are 
in a loss type situation; to obtain measure.s of psycholpgical proba-
bility in such a situation. Instead of having the opportunity to win 
amounts of play money each subject started the game with a larger bank-
roll ($13,000 instead of $4000) and lost parts of it throughout the game. 
On each roll of the dice a subject could only lose .money or break even. 
The subject who lost the smaller amount of money and had more than his 
lThe instructions and material that faced the subjects and the 
experimenter's instructions are included in the Appendix. 
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opponent at the end of the game was the vrinner and received the winner's 
prize. 
During the course of the game the subjects could pass or bid 
when the bet was revealed. If both passed both had to roll the dice. 
If bidding occurred the higher bidder paid the amount of his bid to the 
experimenter: he gave up that amount, but could lose no more. The 
lower bidder took the risk of losing the :full amount on the card. The 
lower bidder rolled the dice with the probabilities of loss, ranging 
:from .01 through .99. If he rolled one of the points he lost the :full 
amount on the card. In this situation the points were losing points. 
In this game the higher bidder gave up the amount of his bid to avoid 
the risk of losing the total amount on the card. The lower bidder 
took the risk of losing nothing or the :full amount on the card. 
Aside :from these differences the experimental procedure remained 
the same. The same stimulus cards were used and the instructions were 
different only to the extent of indicating that the pay-offs were 
di:f:ferent.l 
2. 5 Additional Measures 
An Army General Classification Test, First Civilian Edition, Form 
AM, and the Hoody-McCall Mixed Fundamentals arithmetic test were admin-
istered to each subject. Some items of personal information including 
age, educational background, marital status and occupation were obtained 
lThe experimenter's instructions and material the subjects had in 
:front of them are included in the Appendix. 
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from each subject. After the game the subjects were interviewed very 
briefly to find out "how they played the game.'' A brief unstandardized 
interview was conducted to determine when the subject would bid or not 
bid and if he did bid at what point he would stop . 
2.6 Differences from the Preston and Baratta Studyl 
The first study was undertaken with only the information in the 
published Preston and Baratta article to guide the replication of 
procedure. The article reported _the essential elements of the study but 
not all of the details of procedure. This resUlted in some differences 
in detail between the original study and the present replication. 
There were some slight differe-nces in the mathematical probabili-
ties of the winning point. Preston and Baratta's subjects had to throw 
3 dice for some of the bets. In our study the subjects alv1ays threw 2 
dice. As a result our probabilities of 0.01, 0.05, 0.95 and 0.99 differ-
ed very slightly from their stated probabilities. In addition we did 
not use story settings as Preston and Baratta did. I n the original 
work all the instructions were contained in the story settings on each 
of the 42 cards. Each one of our stimulus cards contained only the 
probability of winning and the amount of the prize or reward being con-
sidered. ~le had supplementary instruction sheets facing the subjects. 
Preston and Baratta ' s subjects considered only 42 bets: in these stud-
ies subjects considered 49 bets, 7 practice and 42 experimental bets. 
Preston and Baratta used groups of 2 and 4 subjects . In this 
study we used only groups of 2 subjects . Preston and Baratta used some 
lPreston and Baratta, op. cit. 
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subjects who had formal knowledge of probability theory, subjects with 
knowledge of statistics and mathematics . As far as we know none of our 
subjects had such knowledge. Preston and Baratta make no mention of 
giving anything to the loser of their game. Because we were working 
with schizophrenic patients in a hospital setting we thought it ad-
visable to give the loser a single candy bar. 
2.7 Characteristics of the Subjects 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give us information about the age, educational 
level, intellectual abilitie.s, (Army General Classification Test Scores) 
and arithmetic ability of the normal and schizophrenic subjects. 
The age was the subjects age on the day he participated in the 
experiment. Educational level was the highest school grade the subject 
entered but did not necessarily complete. Both of these items of infor-
.mation were obtained by interviewing the subjects. The Army General 
Classification Test and Woody-McCall test we.re. administered by the ex-
perimenter. 
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TABLE 2.1 - Characteristics of the Normal Subjects 
I 
Subjects of First Study N = 20 
Age Education Army General Woody-McCall 
Level Classification Scores Test Scores 
M ean Score 24. 7 10 . 8 114. 6 26.05 
Range 21-35 7-13 Grade 98-137 19-31 
Subjects of Second Study N = 16 
M ean Score 24.6 10.7 112. 9 25.6 
Range 21- 35 8- 13 Grade 98-125 19-31 
Subjects of Third Study N = 20 
Mean Score 26 . 7 11. 7 112. 2 26.4 
Range 21-37 8-14 Grade 88-133 18-33 
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TABLE: 2.2 - Characteristics of the Schizophrenic Subjects 
Subjects of First Study N = 20 
-
Age Education Army General vJoody-McC 
Level Classification Scores 
all 
Test Scores 
' 
M ean Score 28.3 10.6 102.8 25.10 
Ra nge 21-38 8-16 Grade 64- 140 18-32 
Subjects of Second Study N = 12 
M 1ean Score 2:7.8 11.7 103.8 26.5 
Ra nge 21-38 9-16 Grade 71-140 20-32 
Subjects of Third Study N = 20 
M ean Score 29.4 11.3 110 .1 25.9 
Range 23-35 8-17 Grade 71-135 16-35 
CHAPTER THREE: THE RESULTS FOR NORMALS 
3.1 Introduction: The Questions 
This chapter will present the data gathered from the normal 
subjects in the three studies conducted and give information about 5 of 
the 12 questions raised in chapter 1. In this section the logic of the 
studies will be reviewed and the questions this chapter will deal with 
will be presented symbolically: it is these symbolic questions that 
guided the research. 
The expected value model which the three studies dealt with is 
expressed: 
EV = pR + (1-p)L. 1 
In any gambling situation "the rational individual" should offer 
less than the expected value to win or increase his amount of money. 
An individual who offers precisely the expected value, will, in the long 
run neither win nor lose, and the person who offers more than the ex-
pected value, will, in the long run lo-se money. In our study the sub-
jects should have bid as low as possible up to the expected value. 
However, no subject should have allowed his opponent to take a gamble 
for less than the expected value. 
In the first study when the subject was deciding what amount to 
lEV = expected value, p =probability of winning, R = amount of 
prize, {1-p) =probability of loss, L =loss (a negative quantity). 
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offer, no loss quantity was involved and the model reduced to, 
EV = pR • . 
The data obtained were the subjects• bids and the successful mean 
bids of the 10 pairs of subjects were used to get estimates of psycho-
logical probability. The subjects decided what to bid by going through 
some "intuitive11 EV estimation process which was expressed in their 
bids. From the mean bids the estimate of psychological probability was 
obtained by saying: 
MB = P*R and 
P* = MB. 
R 
A most important statement is made abOve. The mean bid is taken 
to be the subjects' estimate of the expected value and the concept of 
psychological probability (P*) is used to rationalize the subjects• 
bidding behavior; make the behavior consistent and understandable. A 
similar analysis is carried out in the second and third studies. 
In the second study the subjects were faced with an expected value 
estimation process very much like the first except that this time they 
had to combine R with (1-p). The model was, 
EV = (1-p)R 
before the subjects made any offer in the form of a bid. When the 
auction was completed the situation became, 
EV = (1-p)R + pL 
and an estimate of psychological (1-p), or (1-P*) was obtained. Again 
the estimate, was obtained by saying: 
MB = (1-P*)R and 
(1-P*) = MB. 
R 
The third study was a somewhat different situation because the 
subjects could never win any amount of play money: the.ir bidding only 
enabled them to reduce losses. The situation was, 
EV = pL and again 
HB = P*L and 
P* = MB. 
L 
Precise, symbolic statements of the 5 questions (1,2,5,8 and 11) 
raised in chapter 1 can now be made and data concerning these questions 
will be presented in subsequent sections of this chapter. Answers to 
the questions will be discussed in chapter 6. 
Question 1. Will the findings of Preston and Baratta be replicated 
using normal subjects? This may be expressed as: 
P*pb = P*rn (?) where 
P*pb = values of psychological probability obtained by Preston and 
Baratta corresponding to the objective probability values of 0.01, 0.05, 
0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 and 0.99. 
P*rn =corresponding values of psychological probability obtained in the 
first study from our normal subjects, the aides. 
Data concerning this question is found in Tables .3.1, .3.2, .3.4, 
.3.5 and is presented graphically in Figures .3.1 and .3.2. 
Question 2. How does the behavior of normal subjects deviate from 
the behavior called for by the expected value model? This may be 
expressed as: 
P* == p (?) 
n 
where 
p =objective probability values 0.01, 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 
and 0.99. 
P*n ==values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 obtained from the normal 
subjects in the three studies. 
Data concerning this question will be found in Section 3.3 
Question 5. Are there differences in the behavior of normals 
when amounts of play money are being accumulated and lost? This may 
be expressed as: 
where 
P* = values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
nw 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 obtained from normals in 
the first study. 
P*nl ==values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 obtained from normals in 
the third study. 
Data concerning this question will be found in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 
and presented graphically in Figure 3.3. 
Question 8. Do psychological probabilities (of normals) of mutu-
ally exclusive events sum to 1 as objective probabilities do? 
If p + (1-p) = 1 does 
P*n + (1-P*n) = 1 (?) where 
p = objective probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99. 
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(1-p) = objective probability values ranging from 0.99 to 0.01. 
P*n =psychological probability values of normals corresponding to 
values of p. 
(1-P*n) = psychological probability values of normals corresponding to 
values of (1-p). 
The elements of P* and (1-P*) will be found in Tables 3.4, 3.6 
and 3.7 and the entire question will be dealt with in detail in chapter 
Question 11. Does the size of the prize affect bidding behavior 
of normals in the Preston and Baratta game situation? This may be ex-
pressed as: 
P*n5 = P*n50 = P*nlOO = P*n250 = P*n500 = P*nlOOO = (?) where 
P*n 5 =psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 for 
normals for the 5 dollar prize value obtained in all three studies. 
P*n50 = psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 for 
normals for the 50 dollar prize value obtained in all three studies. 
P*nlOO =psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 for 
normals for the. 100 dollar prize value obtained in all three studies. 
P*n250 = psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 for 
normals for the 250 dollar prize value obtained in all three studies. 
P*n500 =psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 for 
normals for the 500 dollar prize value obtained in all three studies. 
P*nlOOO = psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 for 
normals for the 1000 dollar prize value obtained in all three studies. 
I 
The results concerning this question are presented in Tables 3 .4 
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3.6 and 3.7 and in Figures 3.4 through 3.9. 
3.2 Results of Previous Studies Related to the Questions 
The Preston and Barattal study already cited served as the stimu-
lus for the first question. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and Figure J.l show the 
results for Preston and Baratta's groups of 2 and for all groups. These 
tables give the mean bid (MB), mathematical expectation (EV), ratio of 
mean bid to expectation (R), and psychological probability (P,.l-), of 
each bet. Figure 3.1 shows the functional relationship between psycho-
logical and mathematical probability for groups of 2 and for all groups 
in the original Preston and Baratta study. In these graphs the psycho-
logical probabilities for the 6 prize values are combined yielding a 
single value to be compared with the objective probabilities.2 
Examination of Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 indicates that when the 
data for all subjects are considered (groups of 2 and 4) the effect of 
overestimation of probabilities 0.01 and 0.05 and underestimation of 
probabilities ranging from 0.25 to 0.99 is present without exception. 
However, Table 3. 2 and Figure 3.1 (data for groups of 2 subjects) re-
veal results that are not so uniform. Psychological probability cor-
responding to the objective probability of 0.05 is less than 0.05 and 
psychological probability corresponding to objective probability 0.50 
lPreston and Baratta, op. cit. 
2rn their article Preston and Baratta reported the EV, MB, and R 
in tabular form for groups of 2 and for all groups. To obtain their 
results that are reported here, it was necessary to calculate the P* 
values for all groups and groups of 2. Preston and Baratta, op. cit., 
pp. 187-89. 
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TABLE 3.1- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probability (P*) 
in the Preston and Baratta Study for All Groups, Based on 20 Games 
··==================== 
Prize Values 
5 50 100 l 250 500 1000 P* 
.01 - EV .05 .50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .51 4.44 4.86 12.75 19.59 59.96 
R 10.2 8.88 4.86 5.10 3.92 6.00 
P* .102 .089. .049 .051 .039 .060 .0649 
. 05 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 
l--1B .98 2.66 5-~2 27.27 27.85 85.40 
R 3.92 1.06 1.10 2.16 1.11 1.71 
P* .196 .053 .055 .109 .056 .085 .0924 
......... 
p.. 
.25 - EV 1.25 12.50 
-
25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00 
l1l MB 1.06 10.21 14.74 .35.53 114.95 2.31.25 
8 R .85 .82 • 59 .57 .92 .93 
r-1 P* .212 .204 .147 .142 .2.30 .231 .1945 CIS 
:> 
:>. .50 - EV 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00 
+=» HB 1.93 21.84 41.56 110.47 242.80 488.50 •rl 
r-1 
R .77 .87 .83 .88 .97 .97 ·r-1 
.0 P* .386 
-4.37 .416 .442 .486 .489 -4424 2 
0 
~ .75 - EV 3.75 '37 .. 50 75.00 187.50 375.00 750.00 
(]) MB 3.7.3 29.98 71.88 168 • .30 .304.70 716.40 l> R .995 .80 .96 .90 .81 .96 •rl ~ P* .746 .600 .719 .67.3 .609 .716 .6774 () (]) 
... 
.0 
.95 - EV 4.75 47.50 95.00 2.37. 50 475.00 950.00 0 
MB .3.41 37.71 7.3.48 161.00 .397.80 790.75 
R .72 .80 .77 .68 .84 .8.3 
P* .682 .754 .7.35 .644 .796 .791 .7.3.36 
.99 - EV 4.95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
HB .3.67 41.72 84.25 226.35 .384.20 91.3.18 
R · 
.74 .84 .85 .92 .78 .92 
P* .7.34 .8.34 .84.3 .905 .768 .913 .8.330 
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TABLE 3.2- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probability (P*) in 
the Preston and Baratta Study for Groups of 2 Only, Based on 5 Games 
Prize Values 
5 50 100 250 500 1000 P* 
.01 - EV .05 .50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .06 .55 2.6 11.75 16.00 25.00 
R 1.2 1.1 2.6 4.7 3.2 2.5 
P* .012 .011 .026 .047 .032 .025 .025 5 
.05 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 
MB .30 3.00 2.25 13.75 30.00 24.00 
R 1.2 1.2 .45 1.1 1.2 . 48 
-
P* .060 .060 .023 .055 .060 .024 .046 9 
p.. 
- .25 - EV 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00 
(/) 
:tlill 1.25 5.75 11.00 53.13 101.25 217.50 QJ 
;::s R 1.0 .46 .44 .85 .81 .87 r-i 
C\1 P* .250 .115 .110 .213 .203 .218 .184 ::> 6 
~ 125.00 250.00 500.00 -!-) .50 - EV 2.50 25.00 50.00 
·.-! 
rl MB 2.00 30.00 51.00 128.75 300.00 550.00 
•.-! 
.0 R .80 1.2 1.02 1.03 1.2 1.1 
.s P* .400 .600 .510 .515 .600 .550 .529 0 2 
~ 187.50 QJ .75 - EV 3.75 37.50 75.00 375.00 750.00 
> NB 3.00 34.13 81.75 200.63 378.75 787.50 •.-! 
..p R .80 .91 1.09 1.07 1.01 1.05 t) 
(I) P* .600 .683 .818 .803 .758 .788 .741 . ., 
.0 
3 
0 
.95 - EV 4.75 47.50 95.00 237.50 475 .00 950.00 
MB 4.85 45.13 88.35 178.13 479.75 940.50 
R 1.02 .95 .93 .75 1.01 .99 
P* .970 .903 . 884 .713 .960 . 941 8 .894 
.99 - EV 4.95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
MB 4.21 47.52 96.03 242.55 480.15 970.20 
R .85 .96 .97 .98 .97 .98 
P* .842 .950 .960 .970 .960 .970 .942 2 
I 
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is slight ly greater than 0. 50. Comparison of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show 
that for groups of 2 the ratios of mean bid to expectation (R), are not 
always larger than 1 for the objective probabilities 0.01 and 0.05; 
nor are they always less than 1 for the objective probabilities 0.25 
t hrough 0.99. For a~l groups, groups of ~ and 4 combined, the ratio is 
larger than l for the objective probabilities 0.01 and 0.05 and less 
than l for objective probabilities 0. 25 through 0.99. 
Nogeel and Mosteller and Nogee2 in their study of the measurement 
of utility, presented subjects with a number of .bets and supplied in-
formation about the value of a Ufair bet. 11 Each subject became familiar 
with the E\T model and knew the expe.cted value of the gambles he con-
sidered. Although the main interest of these studies was in utility, 
the Mosteller and Nogee study did yield some information about psycho-
logical probability. Objective probabilities used in this study ranged 
from 0.01 t o 0.667; specifically 0.010, 0.047, 0.090, 0.167, 0.332, 
0.498 and 0.667 were studied. Mosteller and Nogee analyzed their data 
and found the results contained in Table 3.3.3 
Mosteller and Nogee state that there is general agreement between 
the Preston and Baratta data and their own.4 Differences were obtained 
but it should be noted that the Preston and Baratta data came from an 
auction situation while the Nogee data came from a situation in which 
lNogee, op . cit. 
2Mosteller and Nogee, op. cit. 
3rbid. , p. 397. 
4Ibid. 
34 
TABLE 3.3 - Psychological Probability in the Mosteller and Nogee Study 
Preston and Students Guardsman Approximate Baratta Psychological Psychological 
True Psychological Probability Probability 
Probability Probability (N = 10) (N = 5) 
0.667 0. 55 0.54 0.56 
0.498 0.42 0.47 0.50 
0.332 0.26 0.30 0.36 
0.167 0.15 0.16 0.28 
0.090 0.14 0.081 0.18 
0.047 0.12 0.038 0.083 
0.010 0.07 0.0085 0.052 
subjects made individual decisions to play or not play. 
Edwards ' studies have given information about behavior when sub-
jects are in a situation involving the EV model. In a study in which he 
presented subjects with bets of equal expected value and required that 
they choose between them, he found that certain factors determined the 
choices. The first was a tendency to prefer or avoid long shots; bets 
with low probabilities of winning or losing and large amounts of loss, 
depending on experimental conditions . The second determinant consisted 
of specific preferences among probabilities; a preference for 4/8 
probability of vrinning and an avoidance of a 6/8 probability of losing.l 
Edwards also found that subjects do not like to lose, they ··con-
sistently prefer the alternative which had the lower probabilities of 
losing and necessarily the higher amounts of loss.2 
lEdwards, 11Probability Preferences in Gambling," American Journal 
of Psychology, p. 364. 
2rbid., p. 359. 
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. In another study Edwards presented subjects with bets o:f · 
di:f:fering expected value, bets with both positive and negative expected 
values. The subjects again had to make choices among the bets. · Nathe-
· matically optimal behavior was compared to the obtained behavior. For 
bets o:f dif:fer~ng positive expected value, behavior approximated the 
model ·but there are marked deviations :from such a strategy. Findings 
concerning probabil ity pre:ferences help predict the deviati ons :from the 
EV model~l 
Ed•rards 1 results point out that in a situation o:f loss Hhere the 
subjects are :faced i.·Tith a choice among losing bets they adhere more 
closely to the "rational strategy." 
In his earlier work Edwards rejected the notion of a scale of sub-
j e cti ve pro ba bili ties because utility and subjective probability 1-1ere 
confounded variables . His own work on probability pre:ferences also :faced 
the same difficulty. This dif:ficulty of the confounding of subjective 
probability and utility faces all who work 1-1ith the EV model . ·However, 
some attempt has been made to solve the problem by separating the ef:fects 
o:f utility and subjective probability on behavior. 
Siegel2,3 and Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel4 have attempted to 
lEdwards, "Probability Pre:ferences Among Bets with Di:ffering 
Expected Values, 11 p. 67. 
2si dney Siegel, 11A Method for Obtaining an Ordered Metric Scale, 11 
Psychometrica, 21 (1956), 207-11. 
3Paul Hurst and Sidney Si egel, "Prediction o:f Decisions :from a 
Higher Ordered Hetric Scale," (unpublished draft). 
4Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes and Sidney Siegel, Deci s ion 
Making, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957). 
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separate the effects of subjective probability and utility on behavior. 
The measurement of utility was the primary concern of Siegel and 
his co-workers. They attempted to hold subjective probability constant, 
working with the objective probability 0.50. With subjective proba-
bility constant the effects of utility on behavior are more clearly 
understood. 
Some small amount of work was done on subjective probability. A 
subjective est~ate of the objective probability 0.25 was obtained for 
five subjects. Results tended to confirm the Preston and Baratta work: 
average psychological probability was 0.206.1 
In a later work Edv1ards attempted to obtain a scale of subjective 
probabilities. To do this he designed a complex and lengthy study 
using five subjects; attempting to measure subjective probability and 
utility simultaneously. Using an N bet method be met with a moderate 
degree of success . He states that his most definite finding about 
subjective probabilities is that, 
"in general S's tend to overestimate their chances 
of winning money, while retaining a fairly ob-
jective estimate of their chances of losing it.n2 
Analysis of Edwards ' model does reveal that he has not completely 
separated subjective probability and utility. His model requires the 
assumption that the subjective probability of an event that is certain, 
is 1: where p = 1, (P* = 1). Although this seems to be a safe assump-
tion no data has been collected to support it. 
libid., p. 75. 
2Edwards, "The Prediction of Decisions Among Bets," p. 209. 
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3.3 The Results of the Three Studies 
The results of the three studies in which our normals participated 
will be presented in this section and its subsections. The results of 
each study will be presented separately rather than in relation to the 
questions raised. The questions will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
3.31 The Besults of the First Study 
It seems clear that the general findings of Preston and Baratta 
have been replicated: in an auction situation individuals overestimate 
the likelihood of an event occurring when its probability of occurring 
is 0.01 and 0.05 and underestimate its probability of occurring when 
these probabilities range from 0.25 to 0.99. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5, and Figure 3.2 demonstrate this. Table 3.4 
contains the expected value, mean bid, ratio of expectation to bid, and 
psychological probability , for the 10 pairs of aides in the first study, 
the replication of the Preston and Baratta work. Table 3.5 presents a 
comparison of psychological probabilities of Preston and Baratta's work 
and the present replication. Figure 3.2 graphically represents the 
results of the second study which will be presented in the next section. 
Closer examination of Table 3.4 indicates that the results of the 
first study are similar to Preston and Baratta's results for groups of 
2: there is not complete consistency across rows (the psychological 
probabilities).l Unlike Preston and Baratta ' s results for groups of 2 
no deviation of .the general overbidding and underbidding effect was 
lThe inconsistency across rows will be discussed in Section 3.4 
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TABLE 3.4- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probability (P*), 
of Normals in the First Study 
Prize Values 
5 50 100 250 500 1000 P* 
: ' 
.01 - EV .05 .50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .700 1.000 1.400 4.700 2.100 4.800 
R 14.000 2.00 1.400 1.880 .420 .480 
P* .140 .020 .014 .019 .004 .005 . 033 6 
.05 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 
MB .700 3.900 3.50 12.000 24.500 20.000 
R 2.800 1.560 .700 .960 .980 .400 
P* .140 .078 .035 .048 .049 .020 .061 7 
-p. 
- 62.50 125.00 (J) .25 - EV 1.25 12.50 25.00 250.00 
~ MB 1.200 12.700 14.00 43.90 58.60 117.00 
r-1 R .960 1.016 .560 .702 .469 .468 
a1 
:> P* .240 .250 .140 .176 .117 .117 .174 0 
>. 
~ 
.50 - EV 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00 
•r-i 
r-1 MB 1.70 12.60 35.00 100.00 210.60 361.50 
·r-i 
.0 R .680 .504 .700 .800 .842 .723 
.2 P* .340 .252 .350 .400 .421 .362 .35 0 41 
~ -
187.50 750 .00 CJ) .75 - EV 3.75 37.50 75.00 375.00 
> MB 2.60 36.60 72.90 201.00 417.50 697.00 
•r-i 
~ R . 693 .976 .972 1.072 1.113 .929 t) 
(!) P* .520 .732 .729 .804 .835 . 697 .719 ..... 5 
.0 
0 
.95 - EV 4.75 47 .50 95.00 237.50 475.00 950.00 
MB 3.80 41.80 85.70 194.50 454.70 893.30 
R .800 .880 .902 .819 .957 .940 
P* .760 .836 .857 .778 .909 .893 .839 0 
-
.99 - EV 4.95 49.50 99 .00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
MB 3.80 43.00 87.50 227.70 473.00 746.50 
R .768 .869 .884 .920 .956 .754 
P* .760 .860 .875 .9ll .946 .747 .84 97 
' 
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TABLE 3.5 - Comparison of Objective Probability and Psychological Proba-
bility in the Preston and Baratta Study and this Replication 
P* P* P* 
Objective Preston and Baratta Preston and Baratta Aides 
Probability {All Groups) (Groups 2) N = 20 
N = 40, 20 Games N = 10, 5 Games 10 Games 
"'-
.01 .0649 .0255 .0336 
.05 .0924 .0469 . .0617 
.25 .1945 .1846 .1740 
.50 .4424 .5292 . 3541 
.75 .6774 .7413 .7195 
. 95 .7336 .8948 .8390 
.99 .8330 .9422 .8497 
-
found in the study. 
Table 3.5 shows the similarities and differences between the 
results of study 1 and Preston and Baratta's groups of 2 and 4. The 
general effect of overestimation and underestimation is present in all 
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cells of the table but two; the data from the Preston and Baratta groups 
of 2 for p = 0.05 and p = 0.50. 
3,32 The Results of the Second Study 
In the second study subjects were given the experimenter's proba-
bility of winning. They had to approximate a (1-p) computation and com-
bine that probability value with the prize value to determine how much 
to bid. The results are shown in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.2. It seems 
clear that the overbidding, underbidding effect exists also when the 
subjects must approximate a (1-p) process : overestimation of objective 
TABLE 3.6- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probability (1-P*) 
in the Second Study for Normals 
Prize Values 
5 50 100 250 500 1000 (1-P' P* 
.01 - EV 4.95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
MB 4.000 44.250 97.625 241.125 494.875 971.125 
R .808 .894 .986 .974 1.000 .981 (1-P*) .800 .885 .976 .965 .990 .971 .99 .931 1 
.05 - EV 4.75 47.50 95 .00 237.50 475.00 950.00 
HB 3.625 45.625 96.375 235.500 438.875 970.375 
R .763 .961 1.014 .992 .924 1.021 (1-P*) .725 .913 .964 .942 .878 .970 .95 .898 6 
....... p.. 
_. 
.25 - EV 3.75 37-.50 75'~00 187.50 375.00 750.00 
0) MB 2.500 33.500 74.500 160.125 387.750 737.500 
gJ R .667 .893 . 993 .854 1.034 .983 
r-1 (1-P*) .500 .670 .745 .640 .776 .738 .75 .678 tl! ;:::. 1 
:>, 
+' 
.50 - EV 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00 
·r-1 
r-1 MB 2.125 19.375 49.250 127.000 209.500 411 . 875 
.,-! 
.0 R •· .850 .775 .985 1.016 .838 .824 ~ (1-P*) .425 .388 .493 .508 ./.:19 . 412 .50 .44 0 07 
t: 
(J) .75 - EV 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00 
> MB 1.00 10.625 13.250 68.125 82.375 63 .750 •r-1 
+' R .800 .850 .530 1.090 .659 .255 t) 
Q) (1-P*) .200 .213 .133 .273 .165 .064 .25 .17 ..... 44 
.0 
0 
.95 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 
MB .875 7.250 9.125 15.000 42.750 52.125 
R 3.500 2.90 1.825 1.200 1.710 1.043 
(1-P*) .175 .145 .091 .060 .086 .052 . 05 .101 5 
.99 - EV .05 • 50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .625 .875 7.875 8.125 9.375 11.375 
R 12.500 1.750 7.875 3.250 1.875 1.138 
(1-P*) .125 .018 .079 .033 .019 .011 .01 .047 3 
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probabilities occurred t-Then (1-p) = 0.01 and 0.05 and underestimation 
of objective probabilities occurred when (1-p) = 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 
and 0.99. 
Figure 3. 2 shovrs the similarity betvreen the behavior of the normal 
subjects in the first and second experimental situations. 
3. 33 The Results of the Third Study and Differences in Behavior in vTin 
and Loss Type Situations 
The results of the third study where subjects were in a loss type 
situation appear to be some.what different than the results in the first 
study, the win situation. Table 3.7 indicates that the familiar over-
bidding effect is not as characteristic of the loss type situation as 
i t i s of the win situation. For the objective probability values 0.01 
and 0.05 the overbidding effect is slight if it exists at all. Under-
bidding does seem to be characteristic of the objective probability 
values 0.25, 0.50, 0.95, and 0.99. For p = 0.75, there is a slight 
overbidding effect and although it is very small this result appears to 
be meaningful; the same slight effect is found in the data collected 
from the schizophrenic subjects. This overestimation at p = 0.75 in 
the third study is the only overestimation for a p value larger than 
0.05 that occurs in all three studies. 
Figure 3.3 shows the results of the first and third studies. It 
appears that Edwards 11 findings that subjects have a more objective 
estimate of their chances of losing amounts of money than their chances 
of winning such amounts is characteristic of the auction situation as 
lEdwards, 11The Prediction of Decisions Among Bets," p. 209. 
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TABLE 3.7- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probability (P*) 
in the Third Study for Normals 
Prize Values 
-
5 50 100 250 ' 500 1000 P* 
.01 - EV .05 .50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .10 2.50 .60 1.50 1.10 25.10 
R 2.000 5.000 .6oo .600 .220 2.510 
P* .020 .050 . • 006 .006 .002 .025 .018 2 
.05 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 
MB .40 8.10 1.30 6.20 8.70 3.80 
R 1.600 3.240 .260 .496 .348 .076 
-
P* .080 .162 .013 .025 .017 .004 .050 2 
p. 
-
.25 - EV 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00 
Ol MB 1.60 8.90 12.10 36.70 83.00 248.60 ~ 
r-l R 1.280 .712 .484 .587 .664 .994 
ctl P* .320 .178 .121 .147 .166 .249 .196 > . 7 
>. 
~ 
.50 - EV 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00 •r-i 
r-l MB 1.50 22.60 44.60 ll9.60 249.90 290.60 •r-i 
.0 R .600 .904 .892 .957 1.000 .581 
.8 
0 P* .300 .452 .446 .478 .500 .291 .4111 
S:.. 
~lot 
.75 - EV 37.50 75.00 187.50 375.00 750.00 Q) 3.75 
~ MB 2.90 39.50 78.50 215.30 405.50 773.10 
•r-i 
~ R .773 1.053 1.047 1.148 1.081 1.031 (,) 
Q) P* .580 .790 .785 .861 .811 .773 .766 
'r-;) 7 
.0 
0 
.95 - EV 4.75 47.50 95.00 237.50 475 .00 950.00 
MB 4.60 41.90 93.70 245.70 482.40 948.80 
R .968 .882 .986 1.035 1.016 .999 
P* .920 .838 .937 .983 .965 
-949 .931 9 
.99 - EV 4-95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
MB 3.30 48.90 97.00 248.50 495.20 989.70 
R .667 .988 .980 1.004 1.000 1.000 
P* .660 .978 .970 .994 .990 .990 .930 4 
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well as an individual choice situation. At every value of objective 
probability the aides conformed more close.ly to the expected value 
model in the third study than the first. At p values 0.01 and 0.05 the 
differences, if any, are slight. At p = 0.50, 0.75, 0.95, and 0.99 the 
differences appear to be consistent. It is worth noting that at p = 
0.75 the subjects behave as if they are more likely to lose than the 
objective probability value indicates. Although the overbidding at 
this point appears to be slight a remarkably similar finding occurred 
in the data collected from the schizophrenic subjects. 
Table 3.8 summarizes the psychological probability values of the 
normals in the three studies. 
3,4 The Effect of the Size of the Prize 
3.41 Introduction 
Preston and Baratta maintained that the size of the prize had no 
effect on the subjects• behavior, that behavior was essentially the 
same for a given probability at all prize values. In support of this 
contention they pointed to their findings that for all groups combined 
(Table 3.1) behavior was consistent across rows. 
11Since we have systematic variation from mathematical 
expectation in the columns of Table I, with little evidence 
of the same in rows of the same table, we can exclude the 
size of the prize a,s a factor in the variation. No matter 
what the prize the same tendency is evident, i.e. prizes 
with small probabilities are paid for too generously and 
prizes with large probabilities are taken as bargains •••• 
Hence we are left with the hypo the sis that when p = < 0. 0 5, 
players uniformly conceive the probability as somewhat 
higher, vrhile with p = > 0.25, players uniformly conceive the 
probability as somewhat lower,n 1 
lPreston and Baratta, op, cit., PP• 187-88. 
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TABLE 3. 8 - Psychological Probability of Normals in the Three 
Studies 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
-
p or {1-p) P*n (l-P*0 ) P* n 
.01 .0336 . 0473 . 0182 
. 05 . 0617 .1015 . 0502 
. 25 .1740 .1744 .1967 
: • 50 .3541 .4407 .4111 
.75 .7195 .6781 .7667 
.95 .8390 .8986 .9319 
.99 .8497 . 9311 .9304 
Edwardsl and Davidson2 have pointed out that in an EV bidding 
situation the utility of money or prize va.Lues may be different from 
its objective value and this may affect the subjects • behavior. 
Careful examination of all of the Preston and Baratta data, 
indicates that the systematic variation referred to is not always 
present. Analysis of Table 3.2 yields 13 deviations from the main ef-
fect. For Preston and Baratta ' s groups of 2 when p = 0. 05, P* was 
~0.05 and when p = 0.50, P* was > 0. 50. These findings are based on 
data collected from only 5 games, those with groups of 2 players. 
The results of the three studies presented in this dissertation 
indicate that there is not complete consistency across the rows of 
Tables 3.4, 3.6, and 3.7. In addition it was observed that subjects 
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did not appear to behave in the same manner for all prize values. It 
appeared to the experimenter that some, but not all, subjects were less 
concerned with the $5.00 prize value and more concerned with the 1000.00 
prize value. 
Because of the theoretical questions raised about the effect of 
the utility of the prize values, the observations of the subjects• be-
havior during the games, and the lack of uniformity across rows of 
Tables 3.4, 3.6, and 3.7, it is necessary to consider the effect of the 
size of the prize on the behavior of the subjects. 
The effect of the size of the prize on the bidding behavior of 
subjects will be assessed in three ways: (1) by examining the 
lEdwards, 11The Prediction of Decisions Among Bets, 11 p. 202. 
2oavidson et al., op. cito, pp. 9-16. 
consistency between the psychological probability of the individual 
prize values and the overall measure of psychological probability 
when prize values are combined, (2) graphing the psychological proba-
bility of each prize value for all the three studies and (3) making 
certain corrections at p values 0.01, 0.05, 0.95, and 0.99. 
3.42 Deviations of Psychological Probabilities of Individual Prize 
Values from Combined Measures of Psychological Probability - Consistency 
Across Rows 
In the first two studies results similar to Preston and Baratta 1 s, 
overbidding at p = 0.01 and 0.05 and underbidding at p = 0.25 through 
0.99, were obtained. In the third study slight overbidding was found 
at p = 0.01 and 0.05 and underbidding was found at p = 0.25, 0.50, 0.95, 
and 0.99. Slight and possibly meaningful overbidding was found at 
p = 0.75. 
A measure of t he consistency across the rows of Tables 3.4, 3.6, 
and 3.7 was obtained by giving a (+) score each time the psychological 
probability value of an objective probability-prize value combination 
was consistent with the overbidding or underbidding effect of the com-
bined measure of psychological probability. A (-) score was given when 
an inconsistency was present. The results of this analysis are pre-
sented in Tables 3. 9 and 3.10. 
Examination of Tables 3.9 and 3. 10 clearly indicate that there is 
substantial consistency across rows and that the psychological proba-
bili ty interpretation of the data is appropriate. But the t,otal of Zl 
disagreements found in the tables indicate that the prize values may 
have some effect. Examination of Table 3.10 indicates that 13 of the 
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TABLE 3.9 - Agreements and Disagreements Between the Combined Psycho-
logical Probabilities and Each Psychological Probability-Prize Value 
Combination; for Normal Subjects 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Agree ( +) 33 37 29 99 
Disagree (-) 9 '5 13 27 
-126 
TABLE 3.10 - Agreements and Disagreements Between the Psychological 
Probability Value of Objective Probability-Prize Value Combinations and 
the Combined Psychological Probability Values; Normals in the Three 
Studies 
p = Objective Probability Values 
.01 .05 .25 .50 .75 .95 .99 Total 
r-1 Agree { +) 4 2 5 6 4 6 6 33 
~ Disagree {-} 2 4 1 0 2 0 0 9 +' 
tJ) 
C\l Agree ( +) 6 6 5 5 5 4 6 37 j 
·oisagree (- ) 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 5 
t:r.l 
C""\ Agree ( +) 3 2 5 6 5 4 4 29 
~ (-) ::s ·Disagree 3 4 1 0 1 2 2 13 
-1.3 
tf.l 
Totals •• Agree ( +) 13 10 15 17 14 14 16 
Disagree (-) 5 8 3 1 4 4 2 
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27 deviations can be found where· prize values ~rere combined with ob-
jective probability values 0.01 and 0.05. Section 3.44 deals with this 
finding in greater detail. 
3.43 Psychological Probability (P*) for each Prize Value 
Tables 3.4, 3.6 and 3.7 present the psychological probabilities 
of each objective probability-prize value combination and Figures 3.4 
through 3.9 present these results graphically. 
Examination of Figures 3.4 and 3.6, which present the psychological 
probabilities for the prize values of 5, 50 and 100 dollars in the first 
and second studies, indicates that deviations from the rational model 
seem to be greatest for the 5 dollar prize value . These deviations 
seem most obvious at objective probability values 0.01, 0,05, 0.95, 
and 0.99. 
Other deviations such as overbidding of the 500 dollar prize value 
at p = 0.75 in the first and second studies can also be seen. 
3.44 Corrections at Mathe~tical Probability Values 0.01, 0,05. 0.75 
and 0,99 
Examination of the graphs of the psychological probability of 
each prize value and an analysis of the subjects • task leads to a con-
sideration. of certain corrections. 
The graphs of the psychological probability for the 5 dollar prize 
value confirmed the experimenter's observation that the subjects• be-
havior for this prize value seemed unlike their behavior for other prize 
values. .Analysis of the task that faced the subject reveals that 
because subjects had to bid in multiples of l dollar, when objective 
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Fig. J.B - Functional relationship between mathematical and 
psyobologioal probability in the third study for normals for prize values 
5, 50 and 100 dollars o 
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Figo 3.9 - Functional relationship betveen mathematical and 
psychological probability in the third study for normals for prize values 
250, 500 and 1000 dollars. 
probabilities 0.01, 0.05, 0.95 and 0.99 were combined with prize values 
o£ 5 and 50 dollars, £actors existed that prevented the subjects £rom 
con£orming to the rational model. 
For the three bets, 0.01 - ~~5, 0 . 01- $50, and 0.05 - $5 the 
expected value l-Ias less than 1 dollar. I£ the subjects offered the 
smallest bid possible, 1 dollar, overbidding occurred. On a number o£ 
occasions subjects did ask i£ they could bid less than 1 dollar . This 
characteristic o£ the experimental procedure may have exaggerated the 
overbidding effect at the 0. 01 and 0.05 probability values. 
For the bets 0. 95 - $5, 0 . 99 - $5, and 0. 99 - $50, the expected 
value was larger than 4 or 49 dollars and less than 5 or 50 dollars. 
A number of subjects indicated that they wanted to bid more than 4 or 
49 dollars but less than 5 or 50 dollars . This characteristic of the 
game procedure may have exaggerated the underbidding effect at the 0.95 
and 0.99 probabi l i ty values. 
For 4 of the 7 probability va~ues associated with the ~5 prize 
value and for 2 of the probability values associated i·lith the ;u>50 prize 
value £actors existed that may have prevented the subjects from con-
forming to the EV model . 
Table 3.11 was made eli minating from the calculation of P* the 6 
bets which may have tended to prevent the subjects from conforming to 
the rational model. 
Exami nation of correction Table 3.11 shO\.J"S that for every one of 
the 0.01 and 0.05 probability values the corrections decrease the value 
of P* and bring it closer to the EV model. In the first study where 
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TABLE 3.11 - Corrections at Objective Probability Values, 0. 01, 0.05, 0.95 
and 0.99 
First Study 
p P* P* Corrected Change of Effect 
.01 .0336 .0105 ? 
.05 .0617 . 0460 Change 
.95 .8390 . 8547 No Change 
.99 .8497 .8696 No Change 
Second Study 
(1-p) {1-P*) (1-P*) Corrected Change of Effect 
.01 . 0473 .0354 No Change 
.05 .1015 .0868 No Change 
.95 .8986 .9333 No Change 
.99 . 9311 .9754 No Change 
Third Study 
p P* P* Corrected Change of Effect 
.01 . 0182 . 0098 Change 
.05 .0502 . 0442 Change 
.95 . 9319 .9343 No Change 
.99 .9304 .9860 No Change 
p = 0.01, P* is reduced from 0.0336 to 0.0105 and it is questionable 
whether the overbidding effect exists. For p = 0.05 , P* is reduced from 
0.0617 to .0460 and the overbidding effect no longer exists . 
In the second study corrections reduce the overbidding at 0.01 
and 0.05 but not enough to eliminate the effe.ct. 
In the third study when the corrections are made the slight over-
bidding effects disappear completely. 
The corrections at probability values 0.95 and 0.99 have the 
consistent effect of reducing the underbidding. However, in none of 
the cases did this eliminate the underestimation effect. 
3.5 The Interviews 
It is obvious that despite the deviations from the rational model 
the normal subjects did behave in a manner consistent with the expected 
value model: some relatively accurate intuitive EV estimation process 
occurred. Although the subjects somehow combined probability with re-
ward as the model dictated, most were unable to state what they did. 
In the interviews a small number of subjects said they computed the 
amount they would bid by multiplying the probability by the reward. 
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Most subjects gave a very indefinite account of how they played the game. 
A large number said they considered their chances of winning, the proba-
bilities: a smaller number mentioned both factors . A number of sub-
jects could offer no consistent account of their behavior: they gave 
reasons such as they would bet on their lucky numbers, or some bets 
they would not consider at all. 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SUMMATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBABILITIES 
4.1 Introduction: The Questions 
It is basic in probabi lity theory that the probability of mutually 
exclusive events sum to 1 . This may be expressed as : 
p+q=l or p + (1- p) = 1 1 
This relationship is so fundamental to probability theory, it was in-
evitable that those concerned with psychological probability should 
speculate about the summation of psychological probabilities. 
Mosteller and Nogee state : 
"The present authors find some difficulties in the 
notion of psychological probabilities that need to be 
cleared up . First, is the total psychological probability 
in a situation to be fixed at unity, and does additivity 
hold? If so, just how is this done? To give an illus-
tration, suppose the mathematical probability of A hap-
pening is 0. 5, and that of not A happening is also 0.5; 
then, using Preston and Baratta 1 s curves, the psycho-
logical probability of A is 0.42. The same psychological 
probability value would hold for not A, and assuming ad-
ditivity, the total probability would be 0.84, which is 
less than unity. The failure of the total probability to 
be unity seems unsatisfactory." 2 
Edwards considered the problem and stated: 
"The· notion of subjective probability has some 
serious logical difficulties. The scale of obje.ctive 
probability is bounded by 0 and 1. Should a subjective 
probability scale be similarly bounded or not? If not, 
then .many different subjective probabilities will cor-
respond to the objective probabilities 0 and 1 (unless 
lHarold Davis, College Algebra, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1942), 
PP • 206-207. 
~1osteller and Nogee, op. cit . , p. 398 • . 
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some transformation i s used so that 0 and 1 objective 
probabilities correspond to infinite subjective proba-
bilities, which seems unlikely). Considerations of the 
addition theorem to be discussed in a moment have oc-
casionally led people to think of a subjective probability 
scale bounded at 0 but not at 1. This is surely arbitrary. 
The concept of absolute certainty is neither more nor less 
indeterminate than is the concept of absolute impossibility. 
Even more drastic logical problems arise in connection 
0.5 
OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 
Fig. 3. Hypothetical Subjective 
Probability Curves 
1 
with the addition theorem. If the objective probability of 
event A is p, and that of A not occurring is q then p + q = 1. 
Should this rule hold for subjective probabiliti es? Intui-
tively it seems necessary that if we know the subjective prob-
ability A, we ought to be able to figure out the subjective 
probability of not A, and the only reasonable rule for figuring 
it out is subtraction of the subjective probability of A from 
that of complete certainty. But the acceptance of this ad-
dition theorem for subjective probabilities plus the ideal of 
bounded subjective probabilities means that the subjective 
probability scale must be identical with the objective proba-
bility scale. Only for a subjective probability scale 
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identical with the objective proba.bility scale will the 
subjective probabilities of a collection of events, one 
of which must happen, add up to 1. In the special case 
where only two events, A and not A, are considered, a 
subjective probability scale like Sl or S2 in Figure 3 
would meet the requirements of additivity, and this fact 
has led to some speculation about such scales, particu-
larly about Sl. But such scales do not .meet the a.d-
ditivity requirements when more than two events are con-
sidered. 11 1 
Nagel in a discussion of "non-frequency interpretations of proba-
bility statements 11 says: 
"Hriters on the subject have not always been 
clear as to vThether they regarded a probability as the 
measure of a (psychological) belief, or whether they re-
garded it as a measure of the degree of belief one ought 
to entertain as reasonable. If a probability coefficient 
is the measure of a degree of actual certainty or the 
strength of a belief, the addition and multiplication of 
probabilities require that we determine procedures for 
combining certainties or beliefs in some corresponding 
manner. There are, however, no knovm .methods for adding 
beliefs to one another, and indeed it is difficult to 
know what could be meant by saying that beliefs are ad-
ditive." 2 
Consideration of psychological probabilities leads to a consider-
ation of the summation of such probabilities. The meaning of the sum-
mation of objective probabilities derives from the definition of proba-
bility and is clear, but the meaning of the summation of psychological 
' 
probabilities must be sought in the operations that define the concept. 
Mosteller and Nogee 1 s comment on the failure of total probability 
to sum to unity and their estimation of psychological not-A bear 
l Edwards, "The Theory of Decision Making," pp. 397-,98. 
2Ernest Nagel, "Principles of the Theory of Probability," Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. Otto Neurath, Rudolf 
Carnap, and Charles Harris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 
I, Part II, 388. 
further discussion . There really is no reason to expect that psycho-
logical probabilities should sum to 1. In fact the entire approach of 
these studies prepares us to deal with a systematic deviation from the 
objective model . Rather than rejecting a finding that probabilities 
sum to more or less than 1, such a finding can be seen as consistent 
with the approach of these studies. 
Also, the measure of not-A Mosteller and Nogee assumed. is only 
one that may be taken to equal not-A. The second study was designed to 
obtain a measure of psychological (1-p), (1-P*). Operations, which 
were based on specific notions defined P* and (1-P*) . These operations 
were consistent \vith Ramsey's position. 
Nagel ' s question about the meaning of adding beliefs is also 
answered by these studies: both the estimates of P* and (1- P*) were 
obtained by a bet method. The subject's verbal behavior (which repre-
sented some non-observable or "mental" activity) in a situation in 
which he had to compute some expected value, defined both P* and 
(1-P*). P* and (1-P*) were added to obtain the result.s presented in 
this chapter. The meaning of this summation process seems simple 
enough: if objective probability always equalled psychological proba-
bility then P* + (1-P*) would equal 1 as p + (1-p) = 1. Where P* + 
(1-P*) does not equal 1 we have a deviation from the normative model. 
This discussion leads to question 8. Do psychological proba-
bilities {of normals) of mutually exclusive events sum to 1 as objective 
probabilities do? 
This question may be expressed: 
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p + (1-p) = 1 does 
P*n + (1- P*n) = 1 (?) where 
p =objective probability values 0. 01, 0.05, 0.25, 0. 50, 0.75, 0.95 
and 0.99. 
(1-p) = objective probability values ranging from 0 .99 to 0.01. 
P*n = psychological probability values of normals corresponding to p. 
(1-P*n) = psychological probability values of normals corresponding to 
(1-p) . 
The explanation of bow the estimates of P* and {1-P*) were 
obtained f r om t he subjects behavior has been presented in Section 3.1. 
Consideration of the data presented in Chapter 3 indicates that there 
are two ways of summing P* and (1-P*) . 
If the results of the first and second studies are added the 
estimat es of psychological probability will be obtai ned from, 
pR + (1-p)R; 
p + (1- p) = 1 ; 
andil 
then the question is, 
P*n + {1-P*n) = 1 (?) 
If the r esults of the second and third studies are added the 
estimates of psychological probability will be obtained from, 
{1- p)R + pL; 
(1-p) + p = 1; 
and if 
then the question is, 
(1-P*n) + P*n = 1 {?) 
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It is obvious that the questions are similar in. both cases but in 
the first case the results of the first and second studies are added and 
in the second case the results of the second and third studies are added. 
By these processes the empirical referents of the questions 
concerning the summation of psychological probabilities have been made 
clear. If the subjects bid the expected value, the estimates of psycho-
logical probability would approximate objective probability and the 
summations would vary around 1 . From the results presented in Chapter 
3 it is obvious that there are systematic deviations from the objective 
model: how these deviations affect that summation question will be 
seen in Section 4. 3. 
4.2 Previous Work 
Cohen and Hansel did a brief study of the summation of subjective 
probability. Not using a bet or expected value method and working with 
children, the authors had their subjects estimate the likelihood of 
given events. Although they describe the procedures of their study 
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they do not present the data on which they base the following conclusion: 
"The question therefore is : do these three sub-
jective probabilities add up to 11 1 ? They do , within the 
limits of random variations, so far then, as our evidence 
takes us in this experiment and within the age range 
studied, we have no reason to suppose that the additi ve 
character of subjective probability differs from that of 
mathematical probability." 1 
4.3 The Results 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and Figures 4 . 1 and 4.2 summarize the resUlts 
of the three studies and present answers to the questions concerning 
the summation of psychological probability. 
lJohn Cohen and Mark Hansel, Risk and Gambling: The Study of 
Subjective Probability (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 91. 
TABLE 4.1 - Summation of Psychological Probabilities Obtained from the 
First and Second Studies from the Normal Subjects 
Aides 
P*n + (1-P*n) = (?) 
p (1-p) P*n (1-P*n) P*n + (1-P*n) 
.01 + .99 .0336 .9311 .9647 
.05 + .95 .0617 .8986 .9603 
.25 + .75 .1740 .6781 .8521 
• 50 + .50 .3541 .4407 .7948 
.75 + .25 .7195 .1744 .8939 
.95 + .05 . 8390 .1015 .9405 
.99 + .01 .8497 .0473 .8970 
~ 
P*n derived from EV = pR, first study. 
{1-P*n) derived from EV = {1-p)R, second study. 
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TABLE 4.2 - Summation of Psychological Probabilities Obtained from the 
Second and Third Studies from the Normal Subjects 
Aides 
P*n + (l-P*0 ) = (?) 
p (1-p) P*n (1-P*n) P*n + (1-P*n) 
-
.01 + .99 .0182 .9311 .9493 
.05 + .95 .0502 .8986 .9488 
.25 + .75 .1967 .6781 .8748 
.50 + .50 . 4111" .4407 .8518 
.75 + .25 .7667 .1744 .9411 
.95 + .05 .9319 .1015 1.0334 
.99 + .01 .9304 .0473 .9777 
P~ derived from third study, EV = pL. 
(1-P*n) derived from second study, EV = (1-p)R. 
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4,31 The Results of the First and Second Studies Combined 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present the results of the combinations 
of studies 1 and 2 \-There the psychological probabilities derived from 
pR + (1-p)R are summed. The results indicate that rather than having 
a straight line function P*n + (1-P*n), yields a parabolic function. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the first and second studies. 
The low values of P*n + (1-P*n) occur when p and (1-p) equal 0.50. The 
higher values occurred. when p + (1-p) = 0,01 + 0.99, 0.05 + 0.95, 0.95 
+ 0.05 and 0.99 + 0.01. 
Figure 4.1 presents the same information graphically: the para-
bolic function seems to be clear. For all values of p + (1-p), P*n + 
(1-P*n) is less than 1. The low point of the curve is in the center at 
p = 0.50, (1-p) = 0.50. The high points are at the extremes. Devia-
tions from the rational model were larger at objective probability 
values 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 and smaller at objective probability values 
0.01, 0.05, 0 .95 and 0.99. 
4. 32 The Results of the Second and Third Studies Combined 
Table 4.2 surr~rizes the combination of the second and third 
studies. The low values of P*n + (1-P*n) occur where p and (1-p) 
equal 0.50 and the high value occurs where p and (1-p) equal 0.95 and 
0.05. The similarity to the data presented in Table 4,1 is under-
standable: data from the second study was entered in both tables. 
Figure 4.2 graphically presents the results of combining the 
second and third studies. The elevation of the curve at p = 0.95, 
(1-p) = 0.05 can be understood by noting the small underestimation at 
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p = 0.95 and the overestimation at (1-p) = 0.05. In general the curves 
resemble each other: differences can be understood to reflect differ-
ences that occur when two estimates of psychological probability ob-
tained in a win situation are compared with estimates obtained 'from one 
win and one loss situation. 
This concludes the presentation of the data collected from normal 
subjects. In Chapter 6 the findings will be discussed and related to 
the verbal and symbolic questions raised. 
The data collected from the schizophrenic subjects will be pre-
sented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS: THE BEHAVIOR OF 
SCHIZOPHRENICS D~ SITUATIONS OF RISK 
5.1 Introduction 
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Stated in an imprecise form, one notion these studies investigated 
is that schizophrenics suffer from a disturbance of that rationality 
characteristic of normals. In the following sections we will discuss 
the expected value conception of rationality and review what other 
writers have said about schizophrenia and rationality. 
5.11 The Expected Value Notion of Rationality 
Rational behavior as defined in this study is simply the behavior 
called for by the expected value model. This definition is used be-
cause many decisions that normal humans make can be understood and ex-
plained by an expected value analysis. Also, because i t is consistent 
with intuitive meanings and some previous discussions of rationality 
found in the literatures of economics and psychiatry. Katonal points 
out that for economists, rational behavior is maximizing behavior. 
French states, "Rational behavior is behavior that is effectively 
guided by an understanding of the situation to which one is reacting 
and by a knowledge of how to get what one wants. 112 Both of these 
views have in common the ability of the individual to comprehend the 
factors in a situation and make a decision that will bring him objects 
lKatona, op. cit. 
2French, loc, cit, 
or elements of value. The intuitive concept of rationality has referred 
to behavior that is directed, purposive, and effective. The precise 
definition of rationality used in this study is consistent with these 
.meanings of rationality. 
5.12 Previous Discussions of Rationality and Schizophrenia 
In Chapter 1, a consideration of previous discussions of ration-
ality and schizophrenia was presented. The ideas of Von Domarus and 
Goldstein were discussed briefly. The most systematic treatment of 
the defects and characteristics of rationality and logic in the schizo-
phrenic patient is to be found in Arieti.l,2 
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Arieti 1 s position when stated without equivocation is that normals, 
when awake, generally are logical, following Aristotelian principles, 
and schizophrenics employ a defective logic, called paleologic. He 
states: 
"The laws of logic, enunciated by Aristotle more than 
two thousand years ago, have taught us that A is A and can-
not be B. That's really the point we want to make. The 
schizophrenic, as well as the primitive and the dreamer, 
thinks with a different kind of logic, less perfect than 
ours, a logic which preceded ours in the phylogenetic de-
velopment and t..rhich permits thinking that A is in certain 
cases not only A but A and B. The schizophrenic, as 1o1ell 
as the normal person, when he dreams, regresses to this 
type of logic ••• 1..J'ishes which cannot be sustained by Aristo-
telian logic, ma.y be accepted by an archaic type of logic, 
which in other publications I have called paleologic. 11 3 
lsilvano Arieti, Interpretation of Schizophrenia (New York: 
Brunner, 1955). 
Silvana Arieti, "Primitive Intellectual Mechanisms in Psycho-
pathological Conditions," American Journal of Psychotherapy, 4 (1950), 
4-15. 
3Ibid., p. 5. 
Arieti presents five principles or laws of logic of schizophrenia. 
He accepts Von Domarus 1 principle that schizophrenics assume identity 
on the basis of similarity. He states: 
11The first and most important principle of paleologic 
is the one enunciated by Von Domarus, which in slightly modi-
fied form, is as follovTs: 'Whereas the normal person accepts 
identity only on the basis of identical subjects, the paleo-
logician accepts identity based upon identical predicates.• 
For instance, if, the following information is given to a 
normal person, 1All men are mortal; Socrates is a man, ' this 
normal person will be able to conclude, ' Socrates is mortal.' 
This conclusion is valid because the subject of the major 
premise (all men) contains the subject of the minor premise 
(Socrates) . If on the other hand a schizophrenic happens to 
think, 'The Virgin Mary was a virgin. I am a virgin,' she 
may conclude, 1I am the Virgin Mary.• This delusional con-
clusion is reached because the identity of the predicate of 
the two premises (being virgin) makes the schizophrenic 
accept the identity of the two subjects (the Virgin Hary and 
the patient) . 11 1 
Arieti 1 s second principle is similar to Goldstein's view that 
schizophrenics suffer a loss of the abstract attitude. Arieti believes 
that schizophrenics have lost some of the ability to deal with and 
understand connotations of terms, he states: 
11The second principle of paleologic states that 'where-
as the healthy person in a ivakened state is mainly concerned 
with the connotation and the denotati on of a symbol, but is 
capable of shifting his attention from one to another of the 
three aspects of a symbol, the person who thinks paleologi-
cally is mainly concerned with the denotation and verbal-
ization and experiences a total or partial impairment of his 
ability to connote. • Two .phenomena therefore may be found 
in schizophrenia and other autistic conditions : first the 
reduction of the connotation power, second the emphasis on 
the verbalization." 2 
libid., p. 6. 
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Arieti 1 s third law deals with the schizophrenics• notion of 
causality. He states: 
1
'1-lhereas the normal person is inclined to explain 
phenomena by logical deductions, often implying concepts 
involving the physical world, the person who thinks 
paleologically is inclined to give a psychological (that 
is, volitional) explanation to all phenomena. In other 
words, events are interpreted as caused by the vrill, 
intention or wish of an animated being . It rains because 
the angels sweep the skies; a person is crippled because 
he was punished before he was born; it gets dark because 
people are tired and vrant to sleep •• • The intentions are 
ascribed first to other people, then to inanimate objects. 111 
Arieti's fourth law states that the paleologic thinker ignores 
the past and future and concerns himself with the present. He states: 
''t-lhereas the normal adult is able to think of the 
present, to revive the past and to anticipate the future, 
the paleologic thinker is concerned almost exclusively 
with the present . " 2 
Arieti's fifth principle deals with the formation of schizophrenic 
delusions and hallucinations . 
"The fifth law states that in paleologic thought 
concepts have the tendency to disappear as concepts, 
inasmuch as their content tends to assume a perceptual 
expression. In primitive thinking, ideas are often re-
presented by sensory images . This process of perceptual-
ization is completed in dreams and in hallucinations. In 
dreams, thoughts are translated into visual images; in 
hallucinatory experiences they are predominantly represented 
by auditory perceptions . " 3 
These statements of Arieti present some reasonably understandable 
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ideas about disturbances of thought and logic in schizophrenia. However, 
libid., p. 8. 
2Ibid., p. 9. 
3Ibid., p. 9. 
in another work he practically destroys the testability of his ideas 
by, in effect, saying that paleologic is and i s not characteristic of 
hebephrenics and is not characteristic of paranoid schizophrenics ex-
cept in certain ways . Since the largest single group , of schizophrenics 
is the paranoid group vJe are left with very little that is worthy of 
serious study. Arieti 1 s words are: 
"The adoption of this paleologic way of thinking is 
predominant in that type of schizophrenia which has been 
termed hebephrenic . However, not all thinking in hebeph-
renias follovrs paleologic modes . Islands of logical 
thoughts remain but they are more and more overwhelmed by 
the paleological way of thinking . In the paranoid type 
of schizophrenia a peculiar situation occurs: Aristotelian 
thought is preserved to a considerable extent, but, as we 
shall see later in detail, it is often strangely used to 
support the conclusions reached by paleologic thought . ul 
Arieti advances a very questionable view when he states that he 
has taken Aristotelian logic as his norm because he believes 11it is 
most commonly accepted as representative of normal thinking . "2 
This is a most questionable position. Aristotelian logic is a 
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specific formal system that is an element in the discipline of philosophy 
and not specifically characteristic of the thought of the normal adult. 
Undoubtedly certain elements of it characterize the behavior of adults 
but it is likely that for large portions of the population of the United 
States thought does not follow the Aristotelian model . Probably for 
those who have had specific training in logic {a small group) some of 
their thought does follow Aristotelian modes, but even this may be 
questioned. At any rate, such a question could be answered by empirical 
lArieti, Interpretation of Schizophrenia, p. 187 . 
2Ibid., P• 205. 
studies. Arieti makes such an assertion i·lithout presenting evidence and 
on the grounds that it is 11 commonly accepted. " 
Arieti further reduces the meaningfulness of his formulations by 
saying that the principles enunciated do not have the status of physical 
laws. In his own words: 
"HoHever, before proceeding i..d th this study, it must 
be reemphasized that these paleol ogical principles do not 
have to be interpreted or applied as rigidly as physical 
laws. These principles probably· are nothing else but spec-
ial formulations which help to interpret certain processes . 
The important thing, I think is to have a methodology which 
shows not only how the paleologic mind differs from the 
normal, but also how its way of thinking may be interpreted 
and predicted. 11 l 
These speculations of Arieti have been presented not because the 
work in this dissertation can either confirm or deny them, but because 
they are a succinct summary of the views prevalent in the current 
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psychiatric literature concerning rationality and schizophrenia. Arieti 1 s 
formulations make use of the work of both Von Domarus and Goldstein and 
also contain psychoanalytic ideas . 
5.13 The Sample of Schizophrenics Used in this Study 
The data collected from the schizophrenic subjects must be inter-
preted with considerable caution. The selection of our schizophrenic 
sample described in Chapter 2 indicates that we took neither a random 
sample from the hospital population nor did we take a group that had 
specific illness characteristics. Our criteria were simply that the 
patients be hospitalized at the Brockton Veterans Administration 
libid., p. 210. 
Hospital, diagnosed schizophrenic, be willing to take part in a game 
theory study, and pass our intellectual screening procedures. 
Subjects were neither eliminated nor included because of the 
severity of their illness or the presence or absence of symptoms, nor 
was any rating or measure of the severity of illness obtained. Obvi-
ously those patients who were so actively ill that they could not 
participate in the somewhat complex game task were eliminated. But it 
should be pointed out that it was not until the third study, the one 
in which subjects lost play money constantly, that any subjects who 
got through the screening procedure were unable to play the game. 
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The weaknesses of using patients diagnosed as schizophrenics in 
rigorous research is worthy of some comment. · Many psychologists and 
psychiatrists state that the diagnostic label schizophrenic is of 
limited usefulness . l~ny different symptoms, pathological conditions 
and characteristics of individuals are grouped in the diagnostic cate-
gory schizophrenia . Schizophrenic patients who "are in remission" may 
present a picture of a normal person and even fairly close observation 
may fail to detect deviation from normality. Other schizophrenics who 
have a specific delusion may function in other respects very normally 
and only when questioned about the delusion is their illness apparent. 
Schizophrenics in remission and schizophrenics with spe.cific limited 
delusions behave quite differently from schizophrenics who are depressed, 
fearful, or hallucinated. Future research, if it is to be meaningful, 
must in some systematic manner specify the characteristics of the 
schizophrenic (or better, psychotic) population and sample. 
The research presented in this dissertation must be thought of 
as exploratory and any statements about "schizophrenics" must be 
guarded and conditioned by the knowledge of the characteristics of the 
group studied. 
The schizophrenics were studied as a matter of curiosity not 
because it was believed that precise statements could be. made about 
the psychotic illness. Since no previous observations had been made 
putting hospitalized psychotics in an expected value situation it was 
deemed worthwhile, despite the difficulties and weaknesses, .. to do the 
studies. The next section will present the questions that were asked 
concerning the behavior of schizophrenics in situations of uncertain 
outcome. 
5.2 The Questions 
Before the first data was collected the investigators did not 
know whether psychotic patients would be capable of playing the ex-
perimental game, which is to some extent a complex task. Preston and 
Barattal and Nogee2 had established that college students and national 
guardsmen could pl~y experimental games that required some understanding 
of the expected value model. As it turned out once individuals, 
patients or normals, are placed in the actual game situation and given 
a small number of practice trials they experience little or no dif-
ficulty playing the game. 
The very first thing learned from the studies was that patients 
lPreston and Baratta, op, cit. 
2Nogee, op. cit. 
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diagnosed as schizophrenic can play an experimental game that requires 
the utilization of the expected value .model. 
In this chapter data will be presented that is related to 7 of 
the questions raised in chapter 1; questions 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 
12. The verbal and symbolic expression of these questions follows. 
Question 3. How does the behavior of the schizophrenic subjects 
deviate from the behavior called for by the expected value model? 
P*s =p (?) where 
p = objective probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99. 
P*s =values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 obtained from the schizo-
phrenic subjects in the three studies. 
Question 4. Hill the schizophrenic subjects behave like the 
normals? If there are differences what are they? 
P*s = P*n (?) 
P* = defined above in question 3. 
s 
where 
P*n = values of psycholpgical probability corresponding to objective 
probability values from 0.01 to 0.99 obtained from the normal subjects 
in the three studies. 
Question 6. Are there differences in the behavior of schizo-
phrenics when amounts of play money are being accumulated and lost? 
P* = P* l (?) sw s where 
P* 5 w =values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 obtained from schizo-
phrenics in the first study. 
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P*sl =values of psychological probabili ty corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0. 01 to 0 . 99 obtained from schizo-
phrenics in the third study. 
Question 7 . If there are differences in win and loss type situa-
tions are the differences similar in normals and schizophrenics? 
(P* = P* ) = (P* = ~~ ) (?) 
sw sl nw nl where 
P*sw = defined above in question 6. 
P*sl = defined above in question 6. 
P*nw =values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0. 99 obtained from the normals 
in the first study. 
P*nl = values of psychological probability corresponding to objective 
probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0. 99 obtained from normals in 
the third study. 
Question 9. Do psychological probabi lities of schizophrenics sum 
to l? 
p + (1-p) = l does 
P*s + (1-P*s) = l (?) where 
p = objective probability values ranging from 0. 01 to 0 . 99 . 
(1-p) = objective probability values ranging from 0.99 to 0.01. 
P*8 =psychological probability values of schizophrenics corresponding 
to values of P• 
(l-P*8 ) = psychological probability values of schizophrenics correspond-
ing to values of (1- p). 
Question 10. 1:lhen psychological probabilities of normals and 
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schizophrenics are summed are there differences? 
P* + (1-P* ) = P* + (1-P* ) n n s s 
P*s = defined above in question 9. 
(1-P*s) = defined above in question 9. 
(?) where 
P*n = psychological probability values of normals corresponding to 
values of p. 
(1-P*n) = psychological probability values of normals corresponding to 
values of (1-p) ranging from 0. 99 to 0.01 . 
Question 12. Does the size of the prize effect bidding behavior 
of schizophrenics in the Preston and Baratta game situation? 
P*s5 = P*s50 = P*slOO = P*s250 = P*s500 = P*slOOO (?) where 
P*s5 = psychological probability values ranging from 0 . 01 to 0.99 for 
schizophrenics for the 5 dollar prize value in all three studies. 
P*s50 = psychological probability values ranging from 0. 01 to 0.99 for 
schizophrenics for the 50 dollar prize value in all three studies. 
P*slOO = psychological probabili ty values ranging from 0. 01 to 0.99 for 
schizophrenics for the 100 dollar prize value in all three studies. 
P*s250 =psychological probability values ranging from 0 . 01 to 0.99 for 
schizophrenics for the 250 dollar prize value in all three studies. 
P*s500 =psychological probability val ues ranging from 0 . 01 to 0.99 for 
schizophrenics for the 500 dollar prize value in all three studies. 
P*slOOO =psychological probability values ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 
for schizophrenics for the 1000 dollar prize value in all three studies. 
5.3 The Results of the Three Studies 
The results obtained from the schizophrenic subjects will be 
presented in the following sections: differences between the normals 
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and schizophrenics \rill be indicated. As was done in Chapter 3 the 
results of each study will be presented separately: the general 
questions will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.31 The Results of the First Study 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the first study for schizo-
phrenics and Figure 5.1 presents these results graphically, together 
with the results for normals in the first study. 
The most striking fact that emerges from this data is that there 
is a marked similarity between the behavior of the group of normals and 
schizophrenics . The typical overbidding and underbidding effect appears 
with the curves follO\.J"ing each other closely up to the 0.50 probability 
value . 
There appear to be some differences between the curves at the 
points 0.75, 0.95, and 0.99: the behavior of the normals follows the 
rational model more closely than that of the schizophrenics. Although 
some of the differences are very slight, and it is questionable whether 
they are meaningful, 1rrhere the overbidding exists the schizophrenics 
bid more than the normals and 1r1here the underbidding exists the schizo-
phrenics bid less than the normals. At all 7 points along the curve 
schizophrenic behavior deviated more from the rational model than did 
normal behavior . 
5.32 The Results of the Second Study 
In the second study the familiar effect is present. Psychological 
probability exceeds mathematical probability at 0.01 and 0.05 and is 
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TABLE 5.1- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids {MB), 
rlatio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probability (P*) 
for Schizophrenics in the First Study 
Prize Values 
5 50 100 250 500 1000 P* 
., 
' I . 
. 01 - EV .05 • 50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .500 .Z/0 1.200 11.900 3.900 4.100 
R 10.000 5.400 1.200 4.760 .780 .410 
P* .100 .054 .012 .048 .008 .004 .037 6 
" 
.05 - · EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 
MB 1.100 5.100 2.900 e.ooo 28.900 37.30 
R 4.400 2.040 .580 .640 1.156 .746 
P* .220 .102 .029 .032 .058 .037 .07 97 
,...... 
.25 - EV 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00 p.. 
- MB 1.300 8.100 14.300 40.800 89.000 107.700 
tf.l R 1.040 .648 .572 .653 .712 -431 
ID P* .260 .162 .143 .163 .178 .108 .169 ,::: 0 
tn ' 
> · 
>. .50 - EV 2.50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250.00 500.00 
+) MB 2.000 19•500 32.600 83.300 204.700 235.300 •rl 
r-i R . 800 .780 .652 .666 .819 .471 •rl 
.0 P* .400 .390 .326 .333 .409 .235 .349 Cl1 0 
.0 
0 
H 
.75 - EV 3.75 37.50 75.00 187.50 375.00 750.00 P-4 
ID MB 2.300 28.500 54.900 206.000 306.500 671.500 
> R .613 .760 .732 1.099 .817 .895 •rl 
+) P* .460 .570 .549 .824 .613 .672 .614 C) 
<V I 
6 
.,... 
.o . 
.95 - EV 4.75 47.50 95.00 237.50 475.00 950.00 0 
MB 3.100 38.700 67.000 172.500 419.500 838.500 
R .653 .815 .705 .726 .883 .883 
P* . • 620 .774 .670 .690 .839 .839 .738 6 
.99 - EV 4.95 49.50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
MB 2.700 32.900 76.600 210.400 431.100 610.000 
R . 545 .665 .774 .850 .871 .616 
P* . 540 .658 .766 .842 .862 .610 .713 0 
-
.95 
.75 
1>-4 
~ 
tj 
H ; 
re 
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Fig. 5.1 - Functional relationship between mathematical and 
psychological probability in the first study for normals and sohisophrenics. 
less than mathematical probability at the points ranging from 0.25 to 
0.99. Table 5.2 presents the. results for the schizophrenic subjects 
in the second study and Figure 5.2 presents the same results graphi-
cally together with the results of the normals in the second study. 
However, Table 5.2 shows that at (1-p) = 0.05, the entire overbidding 
effect can be attributed to the overbidding at the $5 prize value. At 
all other prize values the subjects underbid and psychological proba-
bility was less than mathematical probability. This finding will be 
dealt with in Section 5.4. 
Comparison of the behavior of the normals and schizophrenics in 
the second study indicates that the schizophrenics deviated more than 
the normals from the rational model at the objective probability values 
(1-p) = 0.25, 0.50, 0.?5, 0.95 and 0.99. At (1-p) = 0.05, the devia-
tion was greater for the normal subjects and at 0.01 the difference 
does not appear to be meaningful. 
5.33 The Results of the Third Study and the Differences in Behavior in 
Win and Loss Situations 
Table 5.3 presents the results for the schizophrenics in the third 
study and Figure 5.3 presents the same results graphically together with 
the results for normals in the third study. Again the .most striking ob-
servation is the similarity between the results of the normals and 
schizophrenics. Psychological probability exceeds obje.ctive proba-
bility at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.?5. Psychological probability is less than 
objective probability at all other points. For the first time in all 
three studies psychological probability is greater than mathematical 
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TABLE 5.2 - Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychol ogical Probability {1-P*) 
of Schizophrenics in the Second Study 
Prize Values 
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5 50 100 250 500 1000 (1-p) (1-P *) 
-
. 01 - EV 4.95 49.50 99 .00 247 . 50 495 . 00 990.00 . 99 
MB 2.8.33 42.667 88.500 201.000 455 . 000 8.32. 667 . 
R .572 .862 . 894 .812 . 919 .841 
(1-P*) . 567 .853 .885 . 804 .910 .8.33 .808 6 
. 05 - EV 4.75 47. 50 95.00 2.37. 50 475 . 00 950.00 . 95 
MB 2. 500 .30 .667 80.167 189.167 .355 . 8.33 804. 000 
R . 526 . 646 .844 .796 .749 .846 (1- P*) .500 . 61.3 .802 .757 .712 . 804 . 697 9 
-
p.. 
.25 - EV .3. 75 .37 . 50 75. 00 187. 50 .375 .00 750.00 .75 
-
I'll MB 1.167 25.000 59.83.3 191.83.3 345 . 667 664.000 
m R • .311 . 667 .798 1.02.3 . 922 .885 
r-l (1-P*) .2.33 .500 .598 .767 .691 . 664 .575 ~ 7 
~ .50 - EV 2.50 25. 00 50 .00 125.00 250.00 500 .00 • 50 
•ri MB 1.333 20.167 .36.833 86.667 200 . 8.33 279.167 
.--1 
•ri R .53.3 .807 .7.37 .69.3 .80.3 .558 
.0 
~ (1- P*) .267 . 403 . 368 • .347 .402 . 279 • .344 .3 
0 
&:: 
. 75 - EV 1 .25 12.50 25.00 62. 50 125.00 250.00 .25 
Q) MB 1.000 12.000 17.167 16.167 15. 8.33 55 . 500 > 
·ri R . 800 .960 .687 .259 .127 .222 +:! (.) (1-P*) .200 .240 .172 . 065 . 0.32 .055 .127 (!) 2 
.,.., 
.0 
0 
.95 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 . 05 
MB 1.167 2.000 .3.3.33 3.8.3.3 15 .667 18 . 8.33 
R 4. 668 .800 .667 .307 . 627 • .377 
(1-P*) .2.3.3 .040 .033 . 015 .031 .019 .062 0 
. 99 - EV . 05 .50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 . 01 
MB . 8.33 2.33.3 2.000 2.167 4. 667 8.167 
R 16.660 4.660 2.000 .867 .9.33 .817 (1-P*) .167 . 047 .020 .009 . 009 .008 .04.3 3 
.. 
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TABLE 5.3- Mathematical Expectation (EV), Mean Successful Bids (MB), 
Ratio of Expectation to Bid (R), and Psychological Probabi lity {P*) 
of Schizophrenics in the Third Study 
Prize Values 
5 50 100 250. 500 1000 P* 
- ' 
.01 - EV . 05 • 50 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
MB .200 3.000 1.000 2.000 21.300 60 . 500 
R 4.000 6.000 1.000 .800 4.260 6.050 
P* .040 .060 .010 .008 .043 . 061 .036 9 
. 05 - EV .25 2.50 5.00 12.50 25.00 50 . 00 
MB . 400 6.000 6.600 12.100 5.100 63.500 
R 1.600 2.400 1.320 .968 . 204 1.270 
P* 
-
.080 .120 .066 .048 .010 .064 .06 47 
p, 
-
.25 - EV 1.25 12.50 25.00 62.50 125.00 250.00 
t1l MB . 200 6. 300 15.100 27 . 500 83.000 165.000 Q) 
::::1 R .160 . 504 . 604 .440 .664 .660 r-4 
tU P* . 040 .126 .151 .110 .166 .165 .126 > 3 
~ 
. 50 - EV 2. 50 25.00 50.00 125.00 250 .00 500.00 •rl 
r-4 MB 1.100 18.500 44. 400 97 .600 250.900 316.000 •rl 
.0 R .440 . 740 .888 .781 1.004 . 632 
.8 
0 P* .220 .370 .444 .390 .502 .316 .373 7 
&:: 
Q) 
.75 - EV 3.75 37 . 50 75.00 187.50 375.00 750.00 l> MB 2.300 43 . 400 69.500 224.800 425.200 848.800 •rl 
of-) 
0 R . 613 1.157 . 927 1.199 1.134 1.132 Q) P* .460 .868 .695 .899 .850 .849 .77 •r-;, 
.0 02 
0 
. 95 - EV 4.75 47 .50 95.00 237.50 475.00 950.00 
MB 3.700 46. 600 95.600 240.600 467. 400 923.400 
R .779 . 981 1.006 1.013 .984 . 972 
P* .740 .932 .956 .962 . 935 . 923 .90 81 
.99 - EV 4.95 49 .50 99.00 247.50 495.00 990.00 
MB 3.200 46.300 93.700 241.100 488.300 973.700 
R .646 .935 .946 .974 .986 .984 
P* . 640 .926 .937 .964 .977 .974 . 90 30 
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psychological probability in the third study for normals and schizo-
phrenics. 
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probability when the latter is greater than 0.05. This occurs at 0.75 for 
both normals and schizophrenics. 
Although the differences between the data collected from the nor-
mals and schizophrenics in the third study are slight it is interesting 
to note that at every point along the curve the schizophrenics deviate 
from the rational model more than the normals. 
Figure 5.4 graphically presents the behavior of schizophrenics in 
the first and third studies, in win and loss type situations. The 
picture is similar to Figure 3.3, the corresponding results for normals. 
The patients, like the normals, adhere more closely to the rational 
model in the loss situation at all points along the curve except at point 
p = 0.25. For the schizophrenics underbidding was greater at p = 0.25 
in the third study than the first. Figure 3.3 indicates the reverse is 
true for normals. 
It is particularly interesting to find the very slight overbidding 
effect when p = 0.75 in the third study for the schizophrenics as well 
as the normals. When the likelihood of losing is 3/4 subjects appear 
to overestimate their chances of losing. 
Table 5.4 presents psychological probabilities of normals and 
schizophrenics in the three studies. Examination of this table indi-
cates that the normals 1 behavior was closer to the rational model in 19 
of the 21 possible comparisons. Where overbidding existed the normals 
generally overbid less than the schizophrenics . At every point where 
underbidding was the pattern the normals bid more (underbid less) than 
the schizophrenics. Only in the second study at p = 0.01 and 0.05 when 
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TABLE 5.4 - Comparison of Psychological Probability for All Subjects in the Three Studies 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
-
p or (1-p) P* P* (1-P*) (1-P*) P* P* 
~ Normals Schizophrenics Normals Schizophrenics Normals Schizophrenic 
-
s 
.01 .0336 .0376 a.0473 
.0433 .0182 .0369 
.05 .0617 .0797 a.l015 .0620 . 0502 .0647 
.25 .1740 .1690 .1744 .1272 .1967 .1263 
• 50 .3541 .3490 .4407 .3443 .4111 .3737 
.75 .7195 . 6146 . 6781 . 5757 .7667 .7702 
.95 .8390 .7386 .8986 .6979 .9319 .9081 
.99 .8497 .7130 .9311 .8086 .9304 .9030 
~ . 
-- --~~---~--------- - - - - ----- ~------- - -- -----
- ------ ---- ---
aschizophrenic bidding closer to rational model. 
both normals and schizophrenics overbid did the psychological proba-
bility of normals exceed that of the schizophrenics . 
5.4 The Effect of the Size of the Prize 
For reasons discussed in Section 3. 41 the data '\vill be examined 
to see if the size of the prize had any effect on the bidding behavior 
of the schizophrenic subjects. 
5.41 Deviations of Psychological Probabilities of Individual Prize 
Values from Combined Measures of Psychological Probability - Consistency 
Across RO'\vs 
The measure of consistency across rows explained in section 3.42 
was applied to the results obtained from the schizophrenic supjects. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 5. 5 and 5. 6 The 
results are very similar to those obtained from the normal subjects: 
there is substantial consistency across rows . However, the 25 disa-
greements indicate that the prize val ues may have had some effect on 
the bidding behavior of the subjects . Table 5. 6 indicates that 17 of 
the 25 deviations can be found where the prize values are combined with 
the 0.01 and 0.05 objective probability val ues . 
5.42 Psychological Probability (P*) for Each Prize Value 
Tables 5.1, 5. 2, and 5. 3 present the psychological probability 
values of each objective probability- prize value combination and Figures 
5. 5 through 5.10 present these results graphically. Figures 5.5 and 5.7 
indicate that deviation from the rational model appears to be exaggerated 
for the 5 dollar prize value in the first and second studies. A similar 
finding was present in the data collected from the normal subjects. 
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TABLE 5.5 - Agreements and Disagreements Between the Combined Psycho-
logical Probabilities and Each Psychological Probability-Prize Value 
Combination for Schizophrenic Subjects 
Study 1 Study 2 Study .3 Total 
Agree .35 .3.3 .3.3 101 
Disagree 7 9 9 25 
-
126 
96 
TABLE 5.6 - Agreements and Disagreements ·Bet\·reen the Psychological Proba-
bility Value of Objective Probability-Prize Value Combinations and the 
Combined( Psychological Probability Values; Schizophrenics in the Three 
Studies 
p = Objective Probability Values 
. 01 .05 . 25 . 50 . 75 . 95 . 99 Tot al 
,. 
r-1 Agree ( +) 4 .3 5 6 5 6 6 .35 :g 
(-) ~ Disagree 2 .3 1 0 1 0 0 7 tl.2 
N Agree ( +) 3 1 6 6 5 6 6 33 :g 
Disagree (-) "3 5 0 0 1 0 0 9 ~ til 
-
<""'\ 
~ 
:::1 
Agree ( +) 4 4 6 5 4 4 6 3.3 
~ :Disagree (-) 2 2 0 1 2 2 0 9 rn 
.~ - ... 
Totals • • Agree ( +) 11 8 17 17 14 16 18 101 
:Disagree (-) 7 10 1 1 4 2 0 25 
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5,43 Corrections at l~thematical Probability Values 0,01, 0.05, 0,95 
and 0.99 
For the reasons discussed in Section 3.44 corrections of the data 
collected from schizophrenic subjects were made. Table 5.7 shows the 
corrections. The effects of the corrections on the schizophrenic data 
are similar to the effects obtained when a similar analysis was done of 
the data collected from the normal subjects. 
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For every one of the 0.01 and 0.05 probability values, the correct-
ions decrease the psychological probability values bringing them close 
ta the objective probability values. However, only in the second study, 
for p = 0.05, does the correction change the effect from overbidding to 
underbidding. For every value where p = 0.95 and 0.99, the correction 
increases the values of psychological probability bringing them closer 
to objective probability, 
5,5 The Summation of Psychological Probabilities 
In Chapter 4 the theoretical considerations that stimulated the 
investigation of the summation of psychological probabilities and the 
data collected from the normal subjects concerning the summation 
question were presented. In the following sections the corresponding 
data collected from schizophrenic subjects will be presented. This 
data will give answers to the questions concerning the summation of 
psychological probabilities raised in Section 5.2 of this chapter. 
5.51 The Results of the First and Second Studies Combined 
Table 5.8 presents the results of summing the values in the first 
and second studies for schizophrenics. Figure 5.11 presents these 
TABLE 5.7 - Corrections at Objective Probability Values 0.01, 0.05, 
0. 95 and 0. 99 
Fi rst Study 
p P* P* Corrected Change in Eff 
.01 . 0376 . 0179 No Change 
.05 . 0797 . 0516 No Change 
.95 .7386 . 7623 No Change 
.99 . 7130 .7700 No Change 
Second Study 
~ 
(1-:-p) (1-P*) (1-P*) Corrected Change in Effe 
.01 . 0433 .0116 No Change 
.05 . 0620 . 0277 Change 
.95 . 6979 .7375 No Change 
.99 . 8086 . 8579 No Change 
•:tc 
Third Study 
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ect 
ct 
.. 
p P* P* Corrected Change in Effe ct 
.01 . 0369 . 0303 No Change 
.05 .0647 . 0616 No Change 
.95 .9081 . 9417 No Change 
.99 .9030 . 9629 No Change 
TABLE 5.8 - Summation of Psychological Probabilities Obtained from the 
First and Second Studies from the Schizophrenic Subjects 
Schizophrenics 
P* + (1-P*) = (?) 
p {1-p) . P*s (1-P*s) 
' 
P*s + (1-P*s) 
.01 + . 99 . 0376 .8086 .8462 
.05 + .95 .0797 . 6979 .7776 
.25 + .75 .1690 . 5757 .7447 
• 50 + .50 .3490 . 3443 .6933 
.75 + .25 .6146 .1272 .7418 
.95 + .05 .7386 .0620 .8006 
.99 + .01 .7130 .0433 .7563 
P*s derived from EV = pR, first study. 
(1- P*s) derived from EV = (1-p)R, second study. 
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findings graphically together with the corresponding results for normals. 
The similarities between the two curves are quite apparent: the shapes 
of the two curves are remarkably similar and at all points the curve of 
the schizophrenics• data is lower than that of the normals. The under-
estimation present in the first and second studies yields the picture of 
consistent underestimation when the probabilities are summed. 
5.52 Results of the Second and Third Studies Combined 
Table 5.9 presents the results of combining the data collected 
from the schizophrenics in the second and third studies. Figure 5.12 
Fig. 5.11 - Summation ot psyobolo1ioal probability tor normals 
and sobizopbrenios, combining first and second studies. 
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TABLE 5.9 - Summation of Psychological Probabilities Obtained from the 
Second and Third Studies from Schizophrenic Subjects 
Schizophrenics 
P* + (1-P*) = (?) 
p (1-p) P* s {1- P* ) s P* s + (1-P*s) 
.01 + .99 .0369 . 8086 . 8455 
.05 + . 95 . 0647 . • 6979 .76?:7 
.25 + .75 .1263 . 5757 .7020 
• 50 + .50 .3737 . 3443 .7180 
.75 + .25 .7702 .1272 . 8974 
.95 + . 05 . 9081 . 0620 . 9701 
.99 + .01 . 9030 .0433 . 9463 
P*8 obtained from the third study, EV =pL. 
(l-P*8 ) obtained from the second study, EV = (1-p)R. 
presents this material graphically together with the corresponding data 
from normal subjects. The similarity of the curves for normal and 
schizophrenic subjects is striking. The low points of the curves are 
at p = 0.25 and (1-p) = 0.75 and p = 0.50 and (1-p) = 0. 50. 
5. 6 The Interviews 
The material obtained from the interviews with the schizophrenic 
subjects was very similar to that obtained from the normal subjects. 
Most of the patients gave an indefinite account of how they played the 
game. A number said they considered the probabilities and an even 
' 
smaller number mentioned both factors . There were a number of subjects 
who c.ould offer little or no account of how they played the game . 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1 The Experimental Games 
Because the significance and meaning of the results are partially 
dependent on the particular measure of psychological probability used, 
it is worthwhile to consider the tasks from which the measures of 
psychological probability were obtained. Each task, experimental game, 
was related to the expected value model to obtain a measure of psycho-
logical probability under certain conditions. 
Factors in the experimental games might have tended to produce 
the characteristic overbidding and underbidding findings. In the re-
sults sections it was pointed out that for certain of the bets con-
taining the 0.01 and 0.05 probabilities, subjects were forced into 
overbidding if they bid at all. Corrections made reduced the amount of 
overbidding and in some cases removed the overbidding effect completely. 
Similar corrections at probability values 0.95 and 0.99 reduced the 
underestimation effect but in no cases was this effect eliminated. A 
study designed particularly to find out whether the overbidding tendency 
is a stable one appears to be worthwhile. Probability values ranging 
from 0.01 to 0.30 could be studied more systematical~y and more definite 
statements could be made. 
The game used in the first study, the replication, was esentially 
similar to Preston and Baratta 's. The subjects were faced with the 
choice of bidding or not bidding and if the subject chose to bid he then 
had to decide how much to bid. If both subjects passed, no gamble 
occurred. In this game the subjects could accumulate and lose amounts 
of play money. Hhen the subjects first considered the gamble the .model 
was, 
EV = pR, and 
there was no loss quantity . As soon as the subject made an offer of a 
bid the situation changed to, 
EV = pR + (1-p)L, and 
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the loss amount increased with each higher bid offered. The "rational" 
behavior for each subject was to offer as little as possible up to the 
expected value. However, no subject should have let his opponent obtain 
the gamble for less than the expected value of the bet. 
Although this is the rational behavior some subjects expressed 
satisfaction when they were accumulating amounts of play money. 'Hhen 
both subjects underbid, the expected value of the bets was positive. 
This underbidding occurred for the probabilities 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 
and 0.99. Thus, subjects appeared to get some satisfaction from the 
accumulation of play .money even though they were informed and appeared 
to be aware that to win the game the subject had to have more money 
than his opponent. 
The second game was similar to the first but the subject was given 
the experimenter's likelihood of winning and had to compute (1- p) with-
out pencil and paper. The experimenter rolled the dice . In this game 
the .model for the subject was, 
EV = (1-p)R . 
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before he made any bet and, 
EV = (1- p)R + pL 
once he made an offer. 
In the third game the situation was different. The model of the 
situation is 
EV = pL, and 
it remains this . At no time in this game could a subject increase his 
bankroll. In this game the higher bidder automatically lost the amount 
of his bid and the lower bidder took the gamble . Both subjects were 
directly involved in the payoffs of each bet in the third study while 
in the first and second studies only the subject who was the higher 
bidder won or lost money. Of course, in the first two studies the 
player who did not bet was indirectly effected by the outcome of his 
opponent's bet. If both subjects passed in this game both had to roll 
the dice and were involved in a gamble. It appears that in this game, 
because both the subjects were directly involved in the payoff or 
gambling on each bet, they were more active. The increased activity 
may have affected the results. 
There is no question that in the third study the subjects were in-
volved in a loss situation and felt it to be a loss situation. Numerous 
remarks were made similar to 11I can1 t win in this game'' or "what a game, 
I 1ve got no chance at all." It appears that many subjects experienced 
the repeated diminution of their bankroll as a loss to them and as un-
pleasant. 
It also appears that the loss-type situation was disturbing to 
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the subjects: disturbing enough to prevent some subjects from finishing 
the game and making other data of questionable value . In the first two 
studies, the win- type situations, only 1 game of 35 was not completed. 
One aide stated he did not want to finish the game . In the third study, 
the loss- type situations, the data from 7 of 27 games was unusable 
either because the subjects couldn ' t learn the task, asked to be excused 
before the games were completed, or gave data that indicated they did 
not understand the game. This unusual behavior in the third game might 
be attributed to the disturbing effects of a repeated loss- type situa-
tion. 
6.2 The Concept of Psychological Probability 
Edwards points out two general uses of the term psychological 
probability. The first as a name for a school of thought about the 
logical basis of mathematical probability and secondly as a name for a 
transformation of the scale of mathematical probabilities which is re-
lated to behavior . l 
In this dissertation as in Edwards 1 work all references are to 
the second meaning; the subjective value corresponding to an objective 
probability value. 
In another article, Edwards presented a systematic analysis of the 
expected value model and although much of the analysis is not directly 
relevant to this work, the notation presented has been adopted. The 
symbol P* used in this work to represent psychological probability \olas 
lEdwards, 11The Theory of Decision Making," p . 397. 
originally used by Edwards to stand for subjective probability obtained 
by another method.l 
Preston and Baratta used the concept of psychological probability 
to explain and make .more meaningful the bidding behavior of their 
subjects.2 When the psychological probability analysis was applied to 
the data in these studies the. results confirmed Preston and Baratta's 
findings that the psychological probability analysis was most adequate 
to explain the results in win and loss type situations and the results 
when subjects had to estimate p and (1-p). 
Reviewing the expected value model in the first study, 
Kv = pR and the 
psychological probability analysis, 
MB = P*R and 
P* = MB 
R 
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it is possible to solve the model :Cor another value; a subjective value 
of the play money amounts 
EV = pR 
MB = pU 3 
u = !@. 
p 
This analysis of the data was done for all groups in the three 
studies and added little to the understanding of the bidding behavior 
lEdwards, "The Prediction of Decisions Among Bets," p. 201. 
2preston and Baratta, op. cit . 
3u = Subjective value of play money amounts. 
of the subjects. 
6.3 Intelligence and Rationality 
The Army General Classification Test, a measure of intellectual 
abilities, was administered to the subjects. Prior to the data col-
lection it appeared desirable to .match the schizophrenics and normal 
subjects for intellectual abilities but for practical reasons this 
could not be done. The results indicated that there was a 12 point 
difference in intelligence between the .normals and the schizophrenics 
in the first study, a similar difference in the second study but only a 
2 point difference betvTeen normals and schizophrenics in the third 
study. The results indicated that in general the normal subjects de-
viated less from the rational model than the schizophrenics. 
These differences might be attributed to the intelligence dif-
ferences or the schizophrenic pathology. To determine whether intel-
lectual abilities as measured by the Army General Classification Test 
were a significant factor in the rational behavior of the subjects a 
"rationality-intelligence" analysis of the data of the first study was 
done. Each bid of a game was analyzed in the following way. If the 
subject scoring higher in the Army General Classification Test (of the 
pair of subjects who played the game) bid closer to the rational model 
than his opponent a {+) score was assigned to that bet. If the lower 
scorer bid closer to the model a (-) score was assigned to that bet. 
If the expected value of the bet was bid, a 0 score was assigned. 
Statistical analyses of this data yielded no relationship between the 
intelligence differences and rational bidding. 
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6. 4 Discussion of the Questions 
In the follovring sections the 12 questions that guided the studies 
will be discussed. There will be a number of statements made about dif-
ferences in behavior in the three experimental conditions and differences 
between normals and schizophrenics . The discussion suffers from the 
lack of adequate statistical tests of differences . Adequate statistical 
tests of the questions raised could only be approached by an analysis 
of variance, precisely a 7 x 6 x 2 analysis . Unfortunately the experi-
ments conducted and the criterion measures obtained do not satisfy the 
requirements necessary for the use of analysis of variance . It is 
necessary therefore to discuss the results without the assistance of 
statistical techniques . 
Some of the results are so obvious that statistical statements 
are unnecessary but numerous others will be made with limited confidence. 
6.41 Question 1 
The first question asked was, will the findings of Preston and 
Baratta be replicated using normal subjects? This can be expressed 
P* = P* (?) .1 pb rn 
The ansl-rer to this question seems to be clearly, yes . The res~ts 
presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3. 4, 3. 5 and Figures 3. 1 and 3. 2 indicate 
that the overestimation-underestimation effect that Preston and Baratta 
found was also found in the f i rst study of thi s work. vlhen all of the 
lFor the meaning of these and the follovri ng symbols see Sections 
3.1, 4.1 and 5.2. 
Preston and Baratta data was combined there was complete consistency 
across rows. However in this study and for Preston and Baratta 1 s 
groups of 2 there was not such complete consistency. 
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The similarity in findings occurred despite the slight differences 
in procedures and interestingly, in a population somewhat different from 
Preston and Baratta 1s. In the original study students and faculty of 
the University of Pennsylvania served as subjects. In this replication 
psychiatric aides, a different population was used. It seems obvious 
that the results of the first study of this dissertation confirm Preston 
and Baratta 1 s findings . 
6.42 Question 2 
The second question asked was, bow does the behavior of normal 
subjects deviate from the behavior called for by the expected value 
model? This can be expressed 
P*n = p (?). 
The details of the answer to this question can be found in the 
Tables and Figures of Section J.J. The results of the first study have 
already been discussed. In the second study the subjects overestimated 
their likelihood of winning when (1-p) = 0. 01 and 0.05 and underesti-
mated their likelihood of winning when (1-p) ranged from 0.25 to 0.99. 
Subjects deviated from the rational model when they were given their 
own likelihood of winning and when they were given the experimenter 1s 
likelihood of winning. When this finding is considered together with 
the subject 1 s inability to verbalize the factors that determined their 
behavior, it is safe to conclude that subjects are capable of numerous 
expected value estimation processes. It would be interesting to place 
subjects in an EV estimation process which had both win and loss 
quantities present before any bidding or offering began. The model for 
such a situation might be expressed 
EV = pR + (1-p)L - S. 1 
It would be interesting to see how subjects would behave in such 
a situation. 
In the third study, the loss situation, overestimation occurred 
at p = 0.01, 0.05 and 0. ?5. At other points underestimation occurred. 
It is worthwhile discussing the meaningfulness of the deviations 
from rationality in the three studies. It is possible to question the 
meaningfulness of the overbidding effect in the first and third studies 
for normal subjects . 1·1hen the corrections discussed in Section 3.44 
are made, the overbidding effect disappears in J of 4 cases being con-
sidered and is questionalbe in the fourth. The overbidding effect 
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seems secure in the second study. In the third study the overestimation 
is small at p = 0.05 even before the correction is applied. The results 
obtained from the normal subjects, and the considerations presented in 
Section J.4 indicate that additional research is warranted before a 
definite statement can be made about the overbidding effect at p values 
o.ol and o.o5. 
However it should be kept in mind that Griffith,2 SprowlsJ and 
ls = stake; the amount subjects would pay to take the gamble. 
2Griffith, op. cit. 
Jsprowls, op. cit. 
Attneavel found results that indicated an overestimation effect existed 
at low probabilities and the considerations presented in Section 3.4 
are of a post- hoc nature . 
For all objective probability values ranging from 0.25 to 0.99 in 
the 3 studies underestimation occurred except for p = 0.75 in the third 
study . Table 3.7 indicates that the 1 overestimation that occurred was 
slight (P* = 0. 7667) and might not be meaningful . However a similar 
finding occurred in the schizophrenic results (P* = 0.7702) and it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that the overbidding effect is a genuine 
one . When Edwards t2 finding that subjects avoided a 3/4 chance of 
losing is recalled this finding is meaningful. In the third study it 
appears that subjects tried to avoid the 0.75 chance of losing by bid-
ding more than the expected value: they overestimated the likelihood 
of losing when probability of loss was 0. 75. 
The three studies completed provide numerous statements about the 
deviation of behavior of normals from the EV model . From the above 
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discussion it can be seen that some of these statements are more certain 
than others. 
6 . 43 Question 3 
The third question asked was, how does the behavior of schizo-
phrenic subjects deviate from the rational model ? This may be expressed 
as, 
lAttneave, op. cit. 
P* = p (?) 
s 
2Edwards, "Probability Preferences in Gambling." 
The details of the answer to this question can be found in the 
Tables and Figures of Section 5.3. It has already been pointed out 
that the results obtained from the schizophrenic subjects are markedly 
similar to the results obtained from the normals. At every probability 
point studied in the three experiments where overestimation and under-
estimat ion occurred for normals the same effect was found for schizo-
phrenics . It appears that the behavior elicited by the experimental 
game is characteristic of subjects who are quite different. The work 
presented consists of three replicated experimental studies. 
Examination of Table 5.7 shows that when the corrections are made 
in the data collected from the schizophrenic subjects the one change 
that occurs is in the second study. This finding which is different 
from the findings obtained from the normal subjects emphasizes the need 
for a more systematic study of behavior with probabilities of win and 
loss ranging from 0.01 to 0.30. 
6.44 Question 4 
The fourth question asked was, will the schizophrenic subjects 
behave like the normals? If there are differences, what are they? 
This can be expressed as, 
P*s = P*n (?) 
The similarities between the behavior of the schizophrenic and 
normal subjects have already been discussed, however, examination of 
Figures 5.1 , 5. 2, and 5.3, indicate that certain differences may exist. 
Examination of Table 5.4 has shown that for 19 of the 21 possible 
comparisons between the normal and schizophrenic subjects the normals 
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deviated less from the rational model than did the schizophrenics. Many 
of these differences are quite small and may not be considered meaning-
ful, however, when the results of all three studies are considered to-
gether the differences seem meaningful. 
Although this study was seen as exploratory and no attempt was 
made to account for differences between normals and schizophrenics it 
is of some interest to speculate about the differences . The rationality-
intelligence analysis completed indicates that , given the relative 
homogeneity of intellectual abil ities existing among- the subjects, 
intelligence as measured by the AGCT was not a factor . It then appears 
that the ·schizophrenic illness may be responsible for the consistent 
differences between the normals and schizophrenics . 
In order to behave rationally in the game situations it was essen-
tial for the subjects to behave as if they were in conflict with their 
opponent. From unsystematic observations of the subjects the experi-
menter noted that the normal subjects seemed more alert, involved, and 
aware of the interpersonal conflict between the subjects . The patients 
took part in the game and obviously went through some EV estimation 
process but perhaps had less awareness of and concern about the conflict 
element of the experimental situations. This lack of at·rareness and con-
cern, or the lack of ability to function in a conflict situation could 
perhaps, contribute to the differences between normals and schizophrenics. 
In the sense that the term rationality has been used in these 
studies both the normal subjects and the schizophrenics have been remark-
ably rational. It is one of the findings of these studies that normals 
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and schizophrenics can be rational i.e. behave as the rational model 
dictates under varying conditions. The .first study replicated Preston 
and Baratta's results and the second and third studies extended our 
knowledge about the ability of subjects to conform to the EV model . 
In the second study subjects were remarkably 11rational11 when they bad 
to compute an expected value given only the experimenter's probability 
of winning . In the third study the subjects conformed to the rational 
model in a loss situation when given their own probability of loss. 
6,45 Question 5 
The fifth question asked was, are there differences in behavior 
of normals when amounts of play .money are being accumulated and when 
they are being lost? This may be expressed as, 
P*nw = P*nl (?) . 
The results summarized by Figure J ,J indicate that, in general 
subjects deviate less from the rational model in a loss situation than 
in a win situation . These results are consistent with Edwards ' findings.l 
Herbert Simon2 has an interesting notion that might help explain this 
phenomenon. Simon rejects the notion that humans attempt to maximize 
or be rational in the sense of the mathematical model. Rather Simon 
believes that subjects seek a satisfying situation rather than an opti-
mal solution . It was observed that subjects found the win type 
1Edwards 1 findings are presented on page 9 and 10 of this disser-
tation and also in 11The Prediction of Decisions Among Bets, 11 p. 209 . 
2Herbert Simon, 11Ra.tional Choice and the Structure of the Environ-
ment, " Psychological Review, 6J, No . 2 (1956), 129-38. 
situation, the first study, satisfying and they fotmd the loss type 
situation quite dissatisfying. In the first situation subjects made 
such statements as "even if I'm not •o~inning I 1ve got a nice bankroll; 
I'm winning money." In the third study, the loss situation, a number 
of subjects expressed dislike for the constant losses . Thus, if Simon' s 
notion is accurate subjects would be stimulated to more rational be-
havior in a loss type situation where satisfaction can never be obtained 
but dissatisfaction could be reduced by rational behavior . 
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A study could be designed working with the win and loss and subject 
satisfaction- dissatisfaction variables to test Simon' s notions . 
6.46 Question 6 
The sixth question asked was, are there differences in the behavior 
of schizophrenics when amounts of play money are being accumulated and 
when they are being lost? This may be expressed as , 
P*sw = P*sl (?) . 
The results shown in Figure 5. 4 show a pattern very similar to that 
of normals in win and l oss type situations. The general closer conform-
ity to the rational model in the loss situation is present . The remarks 
in the previous section, 6 .45, appear to apply for schizophrenic subjects 
also. 
6 . 47 Question 7 
The seventh question asked vras, if there are differences in win 
and loss type situations are these differences simil ar in normals and 
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schizophrenics? This may be expressed as, 
( p-~ = P* ) = (P* = P* ) (?) 
sw sl · nw nl • 
For the answer to this question it is necessary to compare the 
results presented in Figure 3.3 and Figure 5.4 . Examination of these 
figures shows that the most obvious difference between the normals and 
schizophrenics is that, for the normals, where p = 0.25 underestimation 
is greater in the win situation than in the loss situation. For the 
schizophrenic subjects underestimation, deviation from the rational 
model,is greater in the loss situation at p = 0.25. The results col-
lected from the normal subjects are consistent with the generalization 
that subjects conform more closely to the rational model in the win 
situation. 
It is possible that at p = 0.25 the differences both for normals 
and schizophrenics between behavior in win and loss type situations are 
not meaningful. If we assume that the differences are meaningful then 
it can be said that in both win and loss type situations normals under-
estimate the likelihood of winning and losing and their underestimation 
in the win situation is greater than the underestimation in the loss 
situation. For schizophrenics where p = 0.25 there is underestimation 
in both win and loss type situations but underestimation is greater in 
loss type situations . 
A study of behavior in the range of probabilities 0.01 through 
0.30 might clarify this question. 
6.48 Question 8 
The eighth question asked was, do psychological probabilities (of 
normals) of mutually exclusive events sum to 1 as objective probabili-
. . 
ties do? This may be expressed as, 
P* + (1-P* ) = 1 (?). 
n n 
The writer finds this question particularly intriguing. Nogee, 
Mosteller and Nogee, Edwards, Nagel, Cohen and Hansel, and Davidson, 
Suppes and Siegel have al~ concerned themselves with the question. In 
experimental studies,where behavior is being compared to a mathematical 
model, it is a matter of curiosity whether a basic property of the 
model is consistent with behavior. It is fundamental in probability 
then that p + (1-p) = 1. By adopting Ramsey 1 s theoretical position and 
using Preston arid Barat~a type measures of P* and (1-P*), these studies 
have given a preliminary answer to the question concerning the summation 
of psychological probabilities. 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 presented the results. In Figure 4.1 a para-
bolic like function was obtained and in Figure 4.2 a somewhat different 
function appears . 
It is clear that the systematic deviations of the three studies 
affected the answer to this question. 
From the three studies it was possible to get two answers to the 
question. The first answer is made up of the data of the .first and 
second studies. This parabolic like function of Figure 4.1 has its 
high points at p and (1-p) = 0.01, 0.05, 0.95 and 0.99. At the center 
points it is clear the deviations from the rational model were larger 
and these differences are obvious when the results are summed. 
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The results of combining the second and third studies do not 
yield a curve as regular as that in Figure 4.1 although the curve still 
bears a slight resemblance to a parabola; higher at the extremes and 
lower at the center points. It is interesting to note at one point 
thfs curve is just slightly above 1.0, (rational behavior). It is 
questionable whether this elevation is meaningful. 
The similarities between the two curves may be attributed to the 
fact that the data from the first study was used in both curves . Dif-
ferences may be attributed to differences in results obtained in the 
second and third studies: deviations from the model were greater in 
the second study than the third. 
6.49 Question 9 
The ni~th question asked was, do psychological probabilities of 
schizophrenics sum to 1? This may be expressed as, 
P*s + (1-P*s) = 1 (?). 
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Figures 5.11 and 5.12 present the results for schizophrenics to-
gether with the results for normals. The similarities between the re-
sults for normals and schizophrenics are striking; the shapes of the 
curves are very similar . 'Hhen the results of the first two studies are 
combined the parabolic function is again present. In Figure 5.12 both 
curves are lower at the center points and elevated at the extremes. The 
high points are the same fP = 0.95, (1-p) = 0.05) for both groups of 
subjects• 
6,4,10 Question 10 
The tenth question asked was, ·when psychological probabilities of 
normals and schizophrenics are summed, are there differences? This 
can be expressed as, 
( P*n + {1-P*n~ = f?*s + {1-P*sn (?). 
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Figures 5.11, and 5.12 show the similarities and differences when 
psychological probabilities of normals and schizophrenics are summed. 
It is quite apparent that the form of the functions obtained are very 
similar in both figures . And in both cases vrhen psychological proba-
bilities are summed the normal subjects deviate less from the rational 
model than do the schizophrenics. When the psychological probabilities 
are combined at only one point, (p = 0.95, (1-p) = o.o5J for normals 
combining the second and third studies, does the summation exceed 1? 
At all other points for both normals and schizophrenics P* + (1-P*) = 
less than 1. This elevation can be accounted for by the small llllder-
estimation in the third study at p = 0.95 and the .overestimation at p = 
0.05 in the second study. 
At every point of comparison P* + (1- P*) for schizophrenics is 
less than P* + (1-P*) for normals. It seems clear that the llllderesti-
mation process is greater for schizophrenics than normals and this is 
perfectly consistent l-Tith the results already presented. 
6.4.11 Question 11 
Does the size of the prize affect the bidding behavior of normals 
in the Preston and Baratta game situation? This can be expressed as, 
P*n5 = P*n50 = P*nlOO = P*n250 = P*n500 = P*nlOOO (?) •. 
Preston and Baratta stated that the size of the prize did not affect 
the bidding behavior of their subjects but analyses of the data gathered 
in their studies indicate that it might have. 
In Section 3.4 it was shO>in that there was not complete consist-
ency across rows, and Table 3.9 indicated that deviations across rows 
occurred more frequently for probability values 0.01 and 0.05. Con-
sideration of the experimental games indicated that the prize values 
5 and 50 dollars when combined with the 0.01 and 0.05 probabilities 
might be responsible for the inconsistencies. When corrections were 
made at p values 0.01, 0.05, 0.95 and 0.99 for the prize values 5 and 
50 dollars systematic changes occurred in psychological probability 
values. For p values 0.01 and 0.05 P* was reduced and for p values 
0.95 and 0.99 psychological probability was systematically increased. 
It seems clear that at least at p values 0.01 and 0.05 the prize 
values effected psychological probability. 
6.4.12 Question 12 
The twelfth question asked was, does the size of the prize af-
fect the bidding behavior of schizophrenics in the Preston and Baratta 
game situation? This can be expressed as, 
P*s5 = P*s50 = P*slOO = P*s250 = P*s500 = P*slOOO (?). 
The results presented in Section 5.4 confirmed the findings for 
· normals that certain bets containing prize values of 5 and 50 dollars 
evoked behavior that differed somewhat from that evoked by other prize 
values. Systematic changes in psychological probabilities obtained 
from the schizophrenic subjects can be seen in Section 5.4. 
On the basis of the results and discussion of the results certain 
conclusions seem vrarranted. These conclusions are presented in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
The three experimental studies ha.ve led to a number of con-
clusions about the behavior of normals and schizophrenics in situations 
of uncertain outcome. This dissertation may be viewed as three repli-
cated experimental studies. The findings obtained from the normal 
subjects were confirmed by remarkably similar findings obtained from 
the schizophrenic patients . These studies yield the following con-
clusions. 
(1) In three different experimental situations the · 
behavior of both normal and schizophrenic ' subjects was 
similar to the behavior called for by the expected value 
model. Few subjects stated that they combined a proba-
bility value with a prize value to determine the amount 
they would offer: most subjects gave vague accounts of 
their bidding behavior. 
(2) Certain systematic deviations from the rational 
model occurred in each study. 
(3) In a situation in which subjects had to estimate 
an expected value from the situation EV = pR, the fol-
lowing conclusions seem warranted. The findings of 
Preston and Baratta were confirmed. Normal and schizo-
phrenic subjects overestimate the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an event when that probability is 0.01 
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(4) 
and 0.05 and underestimate probabilities varying from 
0.25 to 0.99 . 
In a situation in which subjects had to estimate 
an expected value from EV = (1-p)R, overestimation of 
probabilities 0.01 and 0.05 and underestimation of proba -
bilities varying from 0. 25 to 0. 99 was characteristic of 
the behavior of normals and schizophrenics . 
(5) In a situation in vrhich subjects had to estimate 
(6) 
(7) 
an expected value from EV = pL, underestimation of proba-
bilities 0. 25, 0 . 50, 0.95 and 0.99 occurred for both 
normals and schizophrenic subjects. At p = 0.75, slight 
overestimation occurred. 
In 19 of 21 possible comparisons the behavior of 
schizophrenics deviated .more from the rational model 
than did the behavior of normals . Given the definition 
of rationality adopted in this work (conformity to the 
EV model), the behavior of normals was more rational 
than that of schizophrenics. 
The behavior of both n.ormals and schizophrenics 
in loss type situations appears to deviate less from 
the rational model than similar behavior in a win type 
situation. These findings are consistent with Simon ' s 
notion that humans 11satisfice 11 rather than 11optimize . 111 
lsimon, op. cit. , p . 129. 
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(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
Psychological probabilities of normals and schizo-
phrenics ~orhen measured by an auction EV method sum to 
less than 1. One measure of P* + (1-P*) yielded a para-
bolic- like function for both normals and schizophrenics. 
When psychological probabilities of normals and schizo-
phrenics are summed the resulting quantity is greater 
for normals than schizophrenics: deviation from the 
rational model is greater for schizophrenics. 
The size of the prize does seem to affect the 
bidding behavior of normals and schizophrenics in the 
Preston and Baratta game situation. The prize values 
of 5 and 50 dollars yield results that differ somewhat 
from other prize values. 
Given the above results, the conformity to and 
the deviations from the EV model, it appears that 
individuals are capable of making numerous, and some-
what complex, expected value estil!L9.tions. A study of 
behavior in the situation, 
EV = pR + (1-p)L - S 1 
would be a matter of interest. 
llJJhere S = stake, the amount subjects t.J'ill pay for a gamble ~ori th 
win and loss quantities. 
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Subject Information Data Sheet 
Name: 
Date of Birth: 
Age : 
Educational Background: 
~1ari tal Status : 
Religion: 
Parent 's Occupation: 
Subject 's Occupation: 
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APPENDIX 
Auction Dice 
EXPERIMENTER 'S INST UCTION SHEET 
Auction Dice 
Game 1 
1. This game will have no effect on your stay in the hospital. 
2. You are given $4000 as an endo\{ment. 
3. We have two sets of slips of papers, one practice and one part 
of the game . 
4. I 111 turn the first card and explain the procedure and betting. 
I 111 auction it off to the highest bidder. You may pass or bid. 
If you both pass we skip this bet. Bidding starts at one dollar. 
5. The successful highest bidder will roll the dice and try to make 
his point . 
6. The probability of the point corresponds to the probability on 
the card. 
7. If the point is made, you receive the prize less the bid. 
8. If the point is not made, the bidder pays out of his endov~ent. 
9 . We will do this until all the bets, slips of paper, are finished. 
10. At the end, the person with the most money gets the Tinner 1 s Prize. 
11. The winner wil l re ceive his choice of a pack of cigarettes or 5 
candy bars . The loser will receive a single candy bar. 
12. After it is over, tell me how you played the game. 
132 
ll~STRUCTION SHEET FACING SUBJECTS THROUGHOUT THE GAME 
Auction Dice 
Game 1 
The slips of paper in front of you will contain 2 numbers. The 
first number will be the probability of -vrinning. The second -vrill be 
the number of dollars you can win when you throw the dice . 
For example: If you see the following: 
. 25 250 
It means that 1 out of 4 times you will win 250 dollars . 
You will be faced 1-rith the following probabilities that have the 
following meaning: 
.01 win 1 out of 100 times 
. 05 1..rin 5 out of 100 times, or 1 out of 20 times 
. 25 win 25 out of 100 times, or 1 out of 4 times 
.50 win 50 out of 100 times, or 1 out of 2 times 
.75 win 75 out of 100 times, or 3 out of 4 times 
.95 win 95 out of 100 times 
.99 win 99 out of 100 times 
You will have the opportunity to win the following numbers of 
dollars: 
5 250 
50 500 
100 1000 
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INSTRUCTION SHEET FACING SUBJECTS THROUGHOUT THE GAME 
Auction Dice 
Game 1 
When the Probability is: You \-lin if You Roll: 
.01 • . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 1st roll; and 5 - 2nd roll 
• 05 . • • • . • . . • . • • . • • 3 
.25 • • . . • . • . • • • 5, 6 
.50 . . . . . . . . . • • . • 5, 6, 8, 9 
.75 . . . . . . • . 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 
.95 . . . . . • . 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
.99 • . . . . . . . 1st roll, anything but 4 or 
2nd roll, anything but 5 
The probability of making your point (any one of the t.rinning 
numbers) is equal to the corresponding probability on your slip of paper. 
As an example, if your slip reads as follows: 
.50 250 
You must roll a 5, 6, 8, or 9 to win 250 dollars. 
You have 1 chance out of 2 (1 out of 2) (.50) of rolling one of those 
numbers. 
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CALCULATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF THE POINTS 
The subjects played a game in which they had to roll tvJO dice. 
To win, specified events (called points) with given probabilities had 
to occur. 
The Probabilities 1,Jere: The Corresponding Points Were: 
.01 • • • • • • • . . . . . . . 
.05 • 
.25 
.50 • 
• 75 • 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
Roll 4 on the first roll and 5 on 
on the second roll 
Roll 3 on one roll 
Roll 5, 6 on one roll 
Roll 5, 6, 8, 9 on one roll 
Roll 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 on 
one roll 
.95 •••••••••••••• Roll 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
on one roll 
.99 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Roll anything but a 4 on the first 
roll Qr anything but a 5 
on the second roll 
The probability of rolling the points used in the study was cal-
culated as follovrs: The probability of rolling a number on a single 
roll of a pair of dice is: 
Number 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Probability 
1/36 
2/36 
3/36 
4/36 
5/36 
6/36 
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Number Probabilit:l 
8 • • . • . . • . • • . 5/36 
9 • • . • • • • • • • • 4/36 
10 . . • • . • • • • . 3/36 
11 • • . • • . • . • . 2/36 
12 . • • • • • • • • . 1/36 
Therefore, the probabilities of the points used in the study were 
computed as follows: 
.01 
• 05 
.25 
.50 
.75 
.95 
• 99 
Roll 4 and 5 • • • • . 
Roll 3 • • • . • . . • 
doll 5, 6 • . . • • • 
Roll 5, 6, 8, 9 • . • 
Roll 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 12 •••••• 
(3/36) (4/36) = 12/1296 = .0093 
2/36 = .0556 
4/36 + 5/36 = 9/36 = .2500 
4/36 + 5/36 + 5/36 + 4/36 = 18/36 = 
.5000 
1/36 + 2/36 + 3/36 + 4/36 + 5/36 + 
6/36 + 5/36 + 1/36 = 27/36 = 
.7500 
Roll 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
8, 9, 10, 11 
• • 2/36 + 3/36 + 4/36 + 5/36 + 6/36 + 
5/36 + 4/36 + 3/36 + 2/36 = 
34/36 = • 9444 
Roll anything but 4 . 
on the first 
roll ~ anything 
but 5 on the 
second roll 
33/36 + (3/36) (32/36) = 11/12 + 
{1/12) (8/9) = 107/108 = .9907 
AUCTION DICZ DATA 
Trial Number T 
p l p l 
p 2 P2 
p 3 p 3 
p 4 P4 
p 5 p 5 
p 6 p 6 
'J!7 P7 
_l 22 
2 16 
- ~ 2'3 
4 15 
5 61 
6 ~6 
7 12 
8 .53 
9 35 
10 26 
11 46 
12 21 
1'3 33 
14 1'3 
1'5 4'3 
16 76 
17 71 
18 ')6 
19 72 
20 64 
21 _41± 
22 31 
23 74 
~ 62 
25 24 
26 66 
27 32 
28 65 
29 54 
30 41 
31 42 
32 34 
33 45 
'34 73 
i') 52 
36 75 
'27 11 
38 25 
39 14 
40 51 
41 55 
42 63 
P:R 
01- 'i 
0'5-_'ill_ 
25-100 
95-100 
50-500 
7'5-1000 
gg-21)0 
0'5- '50 
01- 1000 
05- 100 
01-500 
95-5 
25- 1000 
01- 50 
7'5-100 
25-500 
02-1000 
50- 1000 
05-5 
25-100 
01- 100 
50-100 
g9-l000 
99-5 
7')-1000 
9.9-.50 
95-250 
50-250 
25-5 
99- 250 
95-50 
05-250 
95-1000 
25-50 
95-500 
75-250 
50-5 
50-50 
25-250 
50-500 
99-100 
75- 50 
.99-500 
01-5 
05-500 
01·- 250 
75-5 
75-500 
95-100 
Subject: (1) 
(2) 
s s T 0 
I 
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Date: 
Time: B-
E- •. . 
I 
EXPERIMENTER'S INSTRUCTION SHEET 
Auct ion Dice 
Game 2 
1. This game will have no effect on your stay in the hospital . 
2. You are given $4000 as an endmvment . He have two sets of slips 
of paper, one practice and one part of the game . 
3. 1 111 turn the first card and explain the procedure and betting. 
4. I ' ll auction the gamble off to the highest bidder . You may pass 
or bid. If you both pass -vre skip this bet . Bidding starts at 
one dollar. 
5. I ' ll roll the dice and try to make the poi nt . 
6. The probability of the point corresponds to the probability on 
the card. 
7. If I make the point, you pay me the amount of your bid. 
8. If I do not make the point, I pay you the amount of the prize minus 
the amount you bid. 
9. vJe will do this until all the bets are finished . 
10. At the end, the person with the most money gets the tfinner ' s Prize . 
11. The vrinner -vlill receive his choice of a pack of cigarettes or 5 
candy bars . The loser will receive a single candy bar . 
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D~STRUCTION SHEET FACD~G SUBJECTS THROUGHOUT THE GAME 
Auction Dice 
Game 2 
The slips of paper in front of you will contain two numbers. The 
first number is the probability of \vinning. The second -vrill be the 
number of dollars we will be playing for . I will roll the dice all t he 
time, but remember you are competing with your opponent for the winner's 
prize. 
For exampl e : If you see the follm.ring: 
.25 250 
It .means that 1 out of 4 times I will win vrhen I roll the dice. I 
will win as much as you bid. 
You will be faced with the following probabilities that have the 
follm.ring meanings: 
.01 
The 
. 05 
.25 
.50 
.75 
.95 
.99 
bets 
5 
50 
100 
vrin 1 out of 100 times 
uin 5 out of 100 times or 1 out of 20 times 
-vrin 25 out of 100 times ·or· 1 out of 4 times 
\·Tin 50 out of 100 times or 1 out of 2 times 
vrin 75 out of 100 times or 3 out of 4 times · 
win 95 out of 100 times 
win 99 out of 100 times 
vrill be for the follovJing number of dollars: 
250 
500 
1000 
INSTRUCTION SHEET FACING SUBJECTS THROUGHOUT THE GAME 
Auction Dice 
Game 2 
\{hen the Probability is: I \-lin If I Roll: 
.01 • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . 
.05 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
.25 • . • • • • . • • • • • • . • 
.50 • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 
.75 • . . • • • • • . • • . . • • 
.95 • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 
.99 • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • 
4 on first roll; 5 on second 
roll 
3 
5, 6 
5, 6, 8, 9 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, ll 
lst roll anything but a 4; or 
2nd roll anything but a 
The probability of roy making the point (any one of the winning 
5 
numbers) is equal to the corresponding probability on the slip of paper . 
As an example: If the slip reads as follows: 
.25 250 
I must roll a 5, 6 to win. I ~oTill win l time out of 4. 
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EXPERll1ENTER1S INSTRUCTION SHEET 
Auction Dice 
Game 3 
1. This game vrill have no effect on your stay in the hospital. 
2. You are given $13, 000 as an endowment or bankroll to start the game. 
3. Ue play \vi th tvro sets of slips of papers, one set is made up of the 
practice trials; the second set is for the game. 
4. In this game you will both be losing money. The one vri th the more 
money at the end of the game is ·the winner and gets the Hinner's 
Prize (choice of a pack of cigarettes or 5 candy bars) . 
5. You cannot win any more money (increase your banliToll) and I will 
try to take back what I have given you. The one with the more 
money left at the end of the game gets the Winner ' s Prize . 
The one with the less money loses . The loser ' s prize for coopera-
ting is a single candy bar . 
6. You make all payments from your endowment or bankroll. 
7. 1 111 turn over the first card and auction it off to the highest 
bidder. 
8. You may either pass or bid. However, if you both pass, both of you 
must roll . 
9. You start bidding at one dollar and bid as much as you like . 
10 . The person who bids the most pays that amount to me and does not roll . 
11. The other player rolls the dice; if he gets the point he loses the 
amount on the card. If he doesn' t get the point he pays nothing . 
You Do .Not Hant to Roll The Point. 
12. The probability of the point corresponds to the probability on the 
card. This tells you your chance of losing. The amount on the card 
tells you hovr much you can lose if you roll. 
13. vle \·Jill do this for 7 practice trials and 42 trials in the game . vle 
will not exchange .money permanently in the practice trials but vre 
-vrill in the game trials . 
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14. 1•1hen it is all over the person with the more money wins, the person 
with less money loses . Remember you are playing against each other 
to keep as much of your original $13,000 as possible . You will 
both be losing money throughout the game, but you are playing 
against each other . Try and have more money than your opponent at 
the end of the game . 
15. You have enough money to complete the game. 
16. You pay vrhat you bid, if you are the higher bidder, to get out of 
the chance of losing the amount on the card. 
INSTRUCTION SHEET FACING SUBJECTS THROUGHOUT THE G.AHE 
Auction Dice 
Game 3 
The slips of paper in front of you will contain tt.fo numbers. The 
first number '-lill be the probability of losing. The second t.fill be the 
number of dollars you can lose 1r1hen you throw the dice . 
For example: If you see the following: 
. 25 250 
It means that 1 out of 4 times you 1rrill lose 250 dollars . 
You will be faced 1rrith the following probabilities that have the 
following meaning : 
.01 lose 1 out of 100 times 
.05 lose 5 out of 100 times or 1 out of 20 times 
. 25 lose 25 out of 100 times or 1 out of 4 times 
• 50 lose 50 out of 100 times or 1 out of 2 times 
. 75 lose 75 out of 100 times or 3 out of 4 times 
. 95 lose 95 out of 100 times 
. 99 lose 99 out of 100 times 
You will have the opportunity to lose the following numbers of 
dollars: 
5 
50 
100 
250 
500 
1000 
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INSTRUCTION SHEET FACING SUBJECTS THROUGHOUT THE GAME 
Game 3 
When the Probability Is: 
.01 • • • • • • • • 
.05 • • • • • • • • 
.25 • . • • • • • • 
.50 • • • • • • • • 
.75 • • . • • • • . 
.95 • • • • . • . • 
. 99 • • • • • • . • 
Auction Dice 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . • • 
• • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • 
. • • • • • • • • 
• . • • • • • • • 
You L:>se If You Roll: 
4 - 1st roll; and 5 - 2nd 
roll 
3 
5, 6 
5, 6, 8, 9 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
1st roll, anything but 4, 
2nd roll, anything but 5 
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The probability of making the point (any one of the losing numbers) 
is equal to the corresponding probability on your slip of paper . 
As an example : If your slip reads as follows: 
. 50 250 
You must roll a 5, 6, 8, or 9 to lose 250 dollars. 
You have one chance out of two (1 out of 2) ( . 50) of rolling one of those 
numbers. 
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AUCTION DICE STUDY - AMOUNT OF ORIGINAL ENDOWMENT 
Games 1 and 2 
Number of Bills Denomination Amount 
2 $1000 $2000 
2 500 1000 
6 100 600 
5 50 250 
9 10 90 
10 5 50 
10 1 10 
Total $4000 
In the third study an additional $9000 in play money was given to 
the subjects. One $5000 bill and four $1000 dollar bills raised the 
total endowment to $13,000. 
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ABSTRACT 
The three studies that are reported in this dissertation compare 
human behavior iorith the normative behavior called for by the following 
expected value model: 
EV = pR + (1-p)L, where 
EV = expected value, p =probability of winning, R = amount of reward, 
(1- p) = probability of loss, and L = amount of loss. 
The deviations from the .model, when rationalized, give information 
about decision making in risky situations. The studies grew out of an 
experiment by Preston and Baratta (American Journal of Psychology, 1948) 
which indicated that individuals overestimate the likelihood of the oc-
currence of an event when its probability of occurrence is 0. 01 and 
0.05 and underestimate the likelihood of an event with probabilities 
ranging fro.m 0.25 to 0.99 . 
The concept of psychological or subjective probability was used 
to make the behavior studied more .meaningful. Psychological probabili-
ties are those subjective values, derived from observations of behavior, 
corresponding to the objective probability values which range from 0 
to 1 . 
The first study done consisted of a replication of the Preston 
and Baratta work, using normal and schizophrenic subjects . This study 
gave information about behavior in a win type situation. The second 
study gave information about behavior in a risky situation in which the 
subject was given another person 1s probability of iorinning. To conform 
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to the expected value model the subjects had to complete a (1- p) esti-
mation process. The third study yielded information about behavior in 
a loss type situation. 
Data from the three studies gave information about the question 
, of the summation of psychological probabilities whose corresponding 
objective probabilities sum to 1 . 
A total of 80 subjects, 40 normals and 40 schizophrenics partici-
pated in the studies. The schizophrenics were hospitalized veterans 
and the normals were psychiatric aides employed at a Veterans Adminis-
tration Hospital. The subjects played three experimental dice games, 
using play money, for prizes consisting of cigarettes and candy. 
Measures of intellectual and arithmetic ability were administered to 
the subjects. 
The results of the three studies indicated that both normals and 
schizophrenics are capable of making numerous and somewhat complex ex-
pected value estimations. In general the behavior of subjects follows 
the expected value model, however, certain systematic deviations from 
the rational model occurred in each study. 
In the first study, the previous underestimation, overestimation 
findings were confirmed: both schizophrenics and normals overbid at 
probability values 0.01 and 0.05 and underbid at objective probability 
values ranging from 0.25 to 0 . 99. 
In the second study similar effects were found. vlhere the sub-
jects' likelihood of winning was 0. 01 and 0.05, overestimation occurred: 
where their likelihood of winning ranged from 0 . 25 to 0. 99 underestimation 
~l 
occurred. 
In the third study, the loss type situation, underestimation oc-
curred for probabilities of loss of 0.25, 0.50, 0. 95 and 0. 99 . The 
data appear to indicate that subjects tend to overestimate the likeli-
hood of loss very slightly at p = 0. 75 . 
Comparison of the behavior in win and loss type situation.s, both 
for normals and schizophrenics, indicates that behavior conforms more 
closely to the expected value model in a loss type situation than a 
win situation. 
When psychological probabilities were summed underestimation of 
the rational model was the general finding. In general, the deviations 
from the rational model were greater for schizophrenics than for normals. 
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